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ABSTRACT 
The fire service mission has changed since September 11, 2001, and the threat of 
terrorism is placing new demands on fire service leaders. Expectations of the community 
and a duty to maximize safety for fire service employees have created complex problems 
that will require unique and non-traditional solutions. The challenge for fire service 
leadership is how to best manage the contemporary threat of terrorism while maintaining 
its growing list of traditional mission-oriented requirements. This challenge is especially 
difficult given the low frequency but high risk and impact of terrorist incidents. As the 
nation moves farther away from 9/11, the easier it is to become complacent. Yet all 
accounts suggest that the threat is growing and another attack is inevitable. This thesis 
will outline and provide recommendations in four key areas the fire service must address 
if it is to be successful in meeting its current mission: intelligence, community 
engagement, response, and leadership. Although fire service agencies vary across the 
nation, the recommendations included herein are intended to be universal. Furthermore, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is little doubt that the United States is settling in for a protracted campaign 
against Islamic extremism and terrorism as a whole. The enemy we face is determined to 
devastate our economy, drive western influence from the Middle East, destroy our public 
confidence in government, and expand Islamic influence around the world.1 Although we 
have not seen another attack on the scale of 9/11, we should not fall into complacency 
and falsely believe that we are immune, or worse yet, victorious in our struggle to defeat 
terrorism. In fact, many would suggest that the threat continues to grow. During 
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, terrorism expert Daniel 
Benjamin gave this sobering assessment:  
Today, the United States faces an unnerving paradox. For all the tactical 
successes–the terrorists arrested, plots failed networks disrupted–that have 
been achieved, our strategic position continues to slip. The ideology of 
jihad is spreading. A new generation of terrorists is emerging with few ties 
to al Qaeda but a world-view soaked in Osama bin Laden’s hatred of the 
west, and new areas of the globe are increasingly falling under the shadow 
of this growing threat.2 
The attacks in Bali, Madrid, London, Mumbai, Sharm al Sheikh, Amman, Algiers, 
and the continued attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate that the jihadists continue 
to operate despite international law enforcement and military efforts to suppress their 
activities. Our enemies continue to not only carry out attacks around the globe but are 
effectively spreading radical ideology through the Internet and other forms of media. As 
they work to increase sympathy toward the Islamic struggle, they also seek to radicalize 
the margins and recruit others to join the fight. Even more distressing is evidence that the 
threat is becoming more decentralized, and that groups are forming and taking action 
independently. Bruce Hoffman, an internationally recognized terrorism expert who 
                                                 
1 Lowell E. Jacoby, “Five Years After 911: What Needs to be Done?” E-Notes, Foreign Policy 
Research Institute (February 2007), http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200702.jacoby.fiveyearsafter911.html 
[Accessed July 19, 2007]. 
2 Daniel Benjamin (Senior Fellow, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies), “The Changing Face of Terror–A Post 9-11 Assessment,” testimony before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 13, 2006, 
http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/BenjaminTestimony060613.pdf [Accessed July 19, 2007].  
2 
testified before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on 
International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, addressed the issue: 
The requirement to engage in jihad is relentlessly expounded in both video 
and audio tapes of bin Laden and al-Zawahiri and other senior al Qaeda 
personalities on myriad jihadist web-sites, and by radical clerics, lay-
preachers speaking in mosques or addressing informal circles of adherents 
in more private settings. The struggle is cast in narrow defensive terms: 
extolling the duty of the faithful to defend Islam by the sword.3   
As we settle in for the long haul, the fire service will need to find new and 
innovative ways to meet its homeland security mission. It will not be easy, but the 
consequences are too great to not take the threat seriously. The global jihadist threat, 
personified by al Qaeda, has demonstrated that it is determined, unwavering, and patient. 
We are in a war of wills. The enemy will continue to fight, attempting to undermine our 
resolve, and seek to make our goal of national security too costly or simply 
unachievable.4 We cannot be complacent and we cannot believe that the world is the 
same in the post-9/11 era. We must understand the new paradigm and we must prevail. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
In the post-9/11 era, the fire service has not developed a new strategy to meet its 
homeland security mission. Although there has been greater coordination by fire service 
agencies since 9/11 and much has been done, as a whole the fire service remains without 
a clear strategic vision or national standards to follow. 
Within the realm of homeland security, fire service leaders have acknowledged 
that they must prepare for potential acts of terrorism. But rather than looking at what is 
needed to fulfill the mission and then developing a new strategy to meet those needs, pre-
existing systems and pre-9/11 standards of practice have been used in an attempt to have 
something in place. This may have been appropriate immediately after 9/11, but now, six 
years later, those same outdated methods often remain. At its core, this process has a 
conceptual flaw. The utilization of conventional means and methods against an 
unconventional threat is akin to putting a square peg in a round hole; although it might 
                                                 
3 Bruce Hoffman, Does Our Counterterrorism Strategy Match the Threat? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2005), 12. 
4 Jacoby, “Five Years After 911.” 
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work in some circumstances, it is rarely a very good fit. This square-peg, round-hole idea 
exists because conventional practices were never developed with the flexibility, 
operational scope, and complexity required to manage the threat of terrorism. The current 
lack of a new, proactive, and comprehensive terrorism strategy equates to an inefficient 
response, which neither the public nor the fire service should accept. 
Although additional capability has been realized by applying conventional means 
and methods, in many cases post-9/11 planning scenarios involve only one isolated 
incident, all resources available, and the capacity to respond within a matter of minutes. 
This is not the reality in day-to-day operations, and it will not be the reality during the 
next terror attack. Furthermore, what has generally been ignored is what actions will be 
needed in the event of multiple or concurrent attacks, or when specialized resources are 
not available for response. In highly urbanized areas, specialized resources could easily 
be unavailable or severely delayed in a well-timed attack, such as during rush hour 
traffic. Also, over-reliance on specialized resources has the potential to limit critical 
operations if they are not available. 
There are a number of causes underlying the fire service’s failure or reluctance to 
change: cultural issues, resistance to change, union issues, competing resources, budget, 
and a lack of vision by national organizations, including the National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA), United States Fire Administration (USFA), International 
Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), and International Association of Firefighters (IAFF). 
The adverse consequences of not having a clear vision and a nationally 
recognized strategy can be summed up as follows: First, many agencies are working to 
develop the ability to manage the threat of terrorism, but are doing so independently of 
one another. This means that the same mistakes are repeated over and over again, only by 
different agencies. This is inefficient. Second, terror events have the potential to kill large 
numbers of people, those within the community and first responders.5 The fire service 
and community leaders should insist on the best possible response when lives are at 
stake. 
                                                 
5 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., n.d.), 323. 
4 
The system in place today will work. That is not in question. The question is 
whether it will work efficiently and effectively. This question underscores whether fire 
service agencies are providing appropriate levels of service to the community, and if 
appropriate safeguards are in place to protect fire service personnel from injury. The 
persistent problem that has faced fire service leadership has been the inability to critically 
assess response capabilities, manage risk, and find ways to change organizational culture. 
B. ARGUMENT FOR CHANGE 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the fire service rushed to assemble a response capability 
for future terror incidents. In its haste, it looked for “off-the-shelf” solutions to manage 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) events. Because of 
the hazardous nature of CBRNE materials and because most urban areas had hazardous 
materials teams (hazmat) operating under a recognized and accepted response plan, the 
quick fix was to place the primary responsibility of terrorism response under existing 
hazmat protocol. This provided an immediate response capability that fire service 
managers could point to as protection for the community. 
In the rush to expand fire service capability, the federal government, through the 
U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs (OJP was later incorporated into 
the Department Homeland Security) Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) and 
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants, as well as the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s (FEMA) Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) program, 
allocated billions of dollars to purchase additional equipment. Although the fire service 
now has more “things” than it used to, its capability as a whole has not increased 
proportionally. As evidence of this claim, one has only to read through a random 
sampling of the myriad After Action Reports (AARs) before a common trait emerges. 
The same slow, methodical approach that hazmat teams have used to manage traditional 
industrial hazardous materials incidents is being used to manage a terror incident. In 
report after report, the evaluators criticize the length of time it takes hazmat teams to 
respond, classify the environment, and perform rescue. 
The basis for this thesis is not one of arguing one operational modality over 
another, but one of an evolution in leadership and strategy. The response capability 
5 
immediately implemented after 9/11 was warranted, but does that capability represent the 
best choice or simply the best option at the time? The unanswered question is, if the fire 
service could start from scratch and build a comprehensive pre- and post-event capability 
for the threat of terrorism, what would that system look like? Furthermore, could a more 
effective system be built while maintaining a balance between homeland security and 
traditional fire service missions and values? These are the strategic challenges for fire 
service leadership today. 
Although the challenges are significant, they are achievable. First, the fire service 
must change its culture to understand that the threat is real, that the fire service itself is a 
potential target, and that the ways in which it conducts business must change in order to 
meet the new threat of terrorism. 
Second, fire service leadership must develop a common national strategy on how 
it intends to meet the threat of terrorism. It can no longer rely on traditional response 
methods that repeatedly prove themselves to be inefficient and ineffective. Fire service 
leadership, through the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), International 
Association of Firefighters (IAFF), National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), and the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must promote a common, efficient, and 
effective response methodology. 
Third, the starting point of a comprehensive fire service strategy should not begin 
at the moment of surprise–when the bell sounds and it is time to respond because an 
event has occurred. There are pre-event activities that the fire service must engage in if 
efficient and effective delivery of services to the community and the protection of 
personnel are to be realized. 
At a minimum, there are four basic strategies that must be considered: 
1. Engage in an information and intelligence sharing process with law 
enforcement 
2. Engage with and gain the support of the public 
3. Re-evaluate existing response methods 
4. Change the leadership and the culture 
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1. Information and Intelligence 
The fire service must engage in and be a part of the information and intelligence 
sharing process. The primary reason for intelligence gathering and analysis by any 
discipline is to avoid strategic surprise. The fire service is no exception. Furthermore, 
information and intelligence should significantly drive planning, equipment acquisition, 
and training. Although engaging in information and intelligence activities constitutes a 
change in practice and culture, it is a transformation that must take place in order to 
protect personnel and provide the highest level of service to the community. 
2. Engaging the Community 
Fire service leadership must find ways to interact more effectively with the 
community on terrorism-related issues. Generally speaking, the community has no idea 
what the fire department response capabilities are to a terrorist attack. Nor do many fire 
service leaders know what their community expects of them. There is no doubt that a gap 
exists between community expectations and fire service capabilities.6  That gap should be 
minimized whenever possible. 
As noted previously, numerous AARs are critical of current response methods. 
Fortunately, that information is not widely distributed to the public. However, when 
another attack occurs, and if the same response methods are used and lives are lost, those 
AARs might indicate to the public that problems were known yet little was done to 
correct them. There is ample evidence of public outrage to previous disaster response. 
Hurricane Katrina is a prime example. The fire service has a long history of integrity and 
unwavering public trust; neither should be placed at risk. 
3. Response 
In the post-event realm, the fire service must work to adopt new response 
procedures for CBRNE events. The use of specialty teams (hazardous materials and 
bomb squads) absolutely has its place within the response structure. However, a response 
should not be paralyzed if those resources are not available or if they are slow to deploy.  
                                                 
6 U.S. Fire Administration, “Enhancing Risk Management Capabilities of Local Fire Departments,” 
Press Release, June 7, 2005, http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/media/press/2005releases/060705.shtm [Accessed 
July 19, 2007]. 
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An effective response cannot rely on a few critical individuals. There are new and 
emerging standards that significantly broaden response capabilities, and should be 
considered by fire service leaders. 
4. Leadership 
The fire service has built an outstanding reputation over the past 200 years, and is 
one of two public safety agencies responsible for saving lives and property. There is no 
expectation that fire service personnel should take unreasonable risks, but there should be 
an expectation that they will take a reasonable amount of risk in order to save lives. It is 
time to prove that the fire service is still deserving of its reputation. The fire service is 
engaged in a war. It is time to acknowledge that fact and to respond accordingly. 
The fire service is by nature a conservative environment. Those who wander too 
far from traditional, accepted practice and enter into uncharted territory by proposing 
changes and unfamiliar concepts, are frequently dismissed and ostracized. Some fire 
service managers, who fear the unknown, will challenge any new concepts. There are, 
however, departments that are open to change. For example, the Fire Department of New 
York (FDNY) and the District of Columbia Fire Department (DCFD) in Washington 
D.C., both of which realize change must occur and are willing to try new methods. 
According to FDNY Deputy Chief Joseph Pfeifer, “After being attacked twice, we had 
little choice but to change our operations.”7 The challenge for fire service leadership is to 
question the status quo in its approach to terrorism, to engage more effectively with its 
law enforcement counterparts, to engage in information and intelligence sharing, to reach 
out to its communities, to actively explore new response concepts, and to lead rather than 
be led. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To meet the challenges of homeland security, the federal government began 
calling for changes within the fire service as early as 1997. Under an agreement with the 
Department of Defense, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program 
began delivering terrorism training to America’s fire service providers in the nation’s 120 
                                                 
7 Joseph Pfeifer (Chief of Counterterrorism and Emergency Preparedness, Fire Department of New 
York), telephone interview by author, December 2, 2006. 
8 
largest cities. Correctly perceived as the front-line domestic forces that guard the nation 
against terrorist acts, firefighters and law enforcement figure into nearly every federal 
planning or strategy document. For example, the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security says, “America’s first line of defense in the aftermath of any terrorist attack is its 
first-responder community–police officers, firefighters, emergency medical providers, 
public works personnel, and emergency management officials.”8 This concept of 
firefighters and others as America’s first line of defense stems from the reality that local 
resources are the first on scene and the last to leave, and that all disasters are ultimately 
local events.9 Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the Nation sums up the concept 
well: 
America’s first line of defense is the “first responder” community–local 
police, firefighters, and emergency medical professionals. Properly trained 
and equipped first responders have the greatest potential to save lives and 
limit casualties after a terrorist attack. Currently, our capabilities for 
responding to a terrorist attack vary greatly across the country. Many areas 
have little or no capability to respond to a terrorist attack using weapons of 
mass destruction. Even the best prepared states and localities do not 
possess adequate resources to respond to the full range of terrorist threats 
we face.10 
Similar references can be found in such documents as the Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 4,11 the National Response Plan,12 the 9/11 Commission Report,13 
and the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.14 
Although there has been much discussion from both within and outside the fire 
service on changing and strengthening the capabilities and response to terrorist events, 
                                                 
8 Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: The 
White House, 2002), 41. 
9 Ibid., viii. 
10 The White House, Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the Nation (Washington, DC: The White 
House, n.d.), 10. 
11 The White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction: HSPD-4 
(Washington, DC: The White House, 2002), 5. 
12 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2004), 15. 
13 The 9/11 Commission Report, 323. 
14 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2005), 31.  
9 
little attention has been given to any strategy beyond the tactical and operational 
elements. Examples of this can be found in the various grants that have been awarded by 
the federal government. The most prominent of these grants are the HSGP and UASI 
grants, both of which mainly support equipment acquisition as the primary means to 
increase capability.15 A similar example can be seen in the Target Capabilities List 
(TCL), which outlines the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, respond to, 
and recover from incidents of national significance. The TCL goes further in its 
discussion of strategic capabilities, but remains primarily operational in its focus.16 While 
the ultimate measure of all of this will be how the fire service responds to the next attack, 
the acquisition of tools and equipment (things) seems to dominate much of the literature 
as the easiest way to increase capability. These “things” are, however, only a portion of 
the solution. The missing component, and frankly the most difficult, is the changes that 
need to take place in the traditional values, organizational culture, and leadership within 
the fire service. Fortunately, more emphasis within the literature is emerging that 
suggests these issues, along with equipment acquisitions, need to be considered to fully 
address the threat of terrorism to the community and to emergency response personnel. 
Addressing the “non equipment” issues faced by the fire service, Captain Alicia 
Welch, of the Los Angeles City Fire Department, in her thesis Terrorism Awareness and 
Education as a Preventative Strategy for First Responders states, “If the fire service 
intends to be an effective component of the national effort to secure our communities 
from terrorism, then a complete revamping of existing policies, training and field duties 
must occur.”17 This statement embodies a belief that fundamental changes must occur 
within the fire service, and the changes that are needed are more than purchasing 
equipment and conducting additional planning. 
In the simplest context, the problem with buying more equipment and conducting 
more planning without changing traditional values, organizational culture, and policy is 
                                                 
15 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Announces 1.7 Billion in Homeland Security Grants,” 
Press Release, http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1184781799950.shtm [Accessed August 18, 2007]. 
16 Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2006). 
17 Alicia Welch, “Terrorism Awareness and Education as a Preventative Strategy for First 
Responders” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 1.  
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that the fire service is preparing to fight a war using conventional means against an 
unconventional enemy that uses unconventional means. One of the best views on this 
issue comes from someone outside the fire service, Bruce Hoffman. In his book, Inside 
Terrorism, Hoffman offers the following: 
In sum, the emergence of this new breed of terrorist adversary means that 
nothing less than a sea-change in our thinking and the policies required to 
counter it will be required. Too often in the past, we have lulled ourselves 
into believing that terrorism was among the least serious or complex of 
security issues. We cannot afford to go on making this mistake.18 
The fire service has not been the only discipline that has had to manage change. In 
the war on terrorism, the military has also been forced to look at new and inventive ways 
to manage its operations in a 4th Generation war environment. John Arquilla has written 
several pieces of literature for the U.S. military on changing its management strategies 
and tactics. Arquilla advocates flattening the organizational structure, and giving smaller, 
more mobile units the ability to take action more efficiently and effectively.19 Whether 
Arquilla’s concepts will be applicable to the fire service has not yet been determined, but 
at least one, FDNY, has considered its merits. 
When it comes to change in the fire service, Welch argues that for change to 
occur, the key will be to change the traditional values and organizational culture. 
However, she also admits that changing fire service culture is a challenging thing to do 
because “it is rarely initiated from within and frequently resisted from without.”20 Welch 
says the reason for this reluctance to change is an underlying belief that although a 
terrorist event could happen, it will probably not happen “here.” Welch also cites the 
influence of strong cultural values built on two hundred years of tradition that view the 
fire service first and foremost as a reactionary force.21 
The concept of change is even difficult among fire service leaders and their 
professional affiliations. A quote from the NFPA Journal following the 9/11 attacks 
                                                 
18 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998), 212.   
19 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2000), http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB311.pdf [Accessed 
October 30, 2006], 4. 
20 Welch, Terrorism Awareness and Education, 6. 
21 Welch, Terrorism Awareness and Education, 1. 
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demonstrates the laisser-faire attitude and limited vision that continues to plague the fire 
service: “As with any disaster, NFPA will review its fire service codes and standards and 
make appropriate changes, if changes are necessary.”22 From the other side of the issue, 
Chief Michael Burton, of the Grand Rapids, Michigan, Fire Department, argues that 
“NFPA should step into the terrorism world, if only to provide a good resource and 
yardstick to which fire departments can compare themselves.”23 It is pertinent to note that 
the NFPA, the worldwide leader in establishing standards of practice for the fire service, 
has produced little guidance on the issue of terrorism beyond a few new standards for 
personnel protective equipment. 
Chief Robin F. Paulsgrove, of the Arlington, Texas, Fire Department, has written 
extensively on fire service leadership and management practices. Weighing in on the 
ever-changing environment facing the fire service, Paulsgrove makes an interesting 
comparison regarding firefighters who wrongly assume that the skills which were 
expected of them at the time of employment would be the only ones needed throughout 
their careers.24  Paulsgrove likens this mindset to a General Motors manufacturing plant; 
although the workers belong to a strong union with a reputation for preserving employee 
rights and benefits, they are no longer manufacturing the four-door Caprice. In short, 
change must occur with the changing environment, or there is a reduction in service and 
value to the community.25 A similar view is offered by retired Captain Vincent Doherty, 
of the FDNY, who states, “The Fire Service is at an important crossroads in its history. 
The increasing threat of terrorism, along with the need for the Fire Service to make a 
major contribution to the Homeland Security effort, compels firefighters to expand upon 
their traditional mission requirements.”26 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the FDNY commissioned the McKinsey & Company 
consultancy to review the events of 9/11 and make recommendations for change. After 
losing 343 of its personnel, FDNY wanted to ensure such a tragedy would never happen 
                                                 
22 John Nicholson, “Terrorism: Impetus For Change,” NFPA Journal 95, no. 6 (2001), 44. 
23 Ibid., 44. 
24 Robin F. Paulsgrove, “Weighing a Department’s Mission,” NFPA Journal 26, no. 4 (2002), 36. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Vincent Doherty, Metrics For Success (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), V. 
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again.27 The McKinsey report makes recommendations in operations, planning and 
management, communications and technology, and family and member support services. 
As the McKinsey report was being developed, the FDNY prepared to change its 
leadership and in turn its culture. One of the first things it did was to expand the number 
of staff chiefs, and instill a commitment to moving the organization forward in a unified, 
positive, and supportive manner.28 It also expanded and reorganized its Planning Unit to 
make it more responsive to the needs of operational units.29 
The traditional organizational chart for the fire service resembles a Christmas 
tree—small at the top and broad at the bottom in a cone configuration. Whether by design 
or by accident, the FDNY organizational chart now has a more flattened appearance. This 
model resembles the Netwar and swarming tactics proposed by Arquilla and Ronfeldt 
mentioned previously which gives smaller, more mobile units the ability to take action 
more efficiently and effectively.30 
The FDNY is the largest fire department in the country, and in many ways sets the 
standard for others to follow. The innovative efforts by the FDNY in the post-9/11 
environment are a good example of leadership by its executive staff to meet the needs of 
the community and the department. Although FDNY certainly had the necessary 
incentive to make changes (losing 343 of its personnel), at least one study suggests that 
the fire service at large is primed for change and transformational leadership. A study by 
Rajnandini Pillai and Ethlyn Williams concludes that change is not only possible in fire 
service organizations, but that these organizations are particularly well suited for change, 
especially in the post-9/11 era: 
The study also shows that transformational leadership is effective in yet 
another setting, namely, a fire rescue organization, one that faces a 




                                                 
27 McKinsey & Company, “McKinsey Report–Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness,”   
http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/mck_report/toc.html [Accessed October 26, 2006], 5. 
28 Ibid., 77. 
29 Ibid., 81. 
30 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Swarming, 9. 
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world with heightened fears with respect to terrorism and requiring 
innovative responses, in which there is a great need for outstanding 
leadership.31 
Pillai and Williams go on to say, “This setting is particularly suited to the 
emergence of transformational leadership and presents opportunities for responding to 
dynamic situations: leaders are called upon to role model heroic behaviors and build 
cohesive teams that are capable of responding in real time with innovative solutions to 
life threatening situations.”32 
As the fire service continues its search for both leadership and operational 
capability in the post-9/11 era, one of the best measures of its advancement can be found 
in a variety of AARs. Like the references to change in the national strategy documents 
noted previously, there are numerous chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 
explosive AARs from national events like the Top Officials (TOPOFF) exercise or from 
state, regional, or local exercises. A good source for these is the Lessons Learned 
Information Sharing Web site.33 It provides ample examples and opinions of both 
successful and unsuccessful approaches to building a more effective fire service response 
to the terrorism problem. 
In summary, the literature available on the fire service’s current state of terrorism 
preparedness, its culture, the need to change, organizational management structures, and 
past practices is significant because in its collective sense, it all points to the need to 
make changes. Whether considering the opinions of Alicia Welch, Bruce Hoffman, John 
Arquilla, Rajnandini Pillai and Ethlyn Williams, or the host of others who have produced 
literature on this subject, they all offer different perspectives but of the same problem, 
that the current system needs to change and improve. This thesis will build on the 
literature currently available, and add to the academic discussion on this topic. 
 
                                                 
31 Rajnandini Pillai and Ethlyn A. Williams, “Transformational Leadership, Self Efficacy, Group 
Cohesiveness, Commitment, and Performance,” Journal of Organizational Change Management 17, no. 2 
(2004), 154. 
32 Ibid., 156. 
33 Department of Homeland Security, Lessons Learned Information Sharing, http://www.llis.dhs.gov 
[Accessed November 26, 2006]. 
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D. OVERVIEW 
This thesis will explore some of the strategic changes the fire service should 
consider in the post-9/11 era. It will remain at a strategic focus, and will not delve into 
tactical or operational issues except to provide examples of why one strategy should be 
changed or another adopted. Its central focus will remain on four assertions: the fire 
service must engage in the information and intelligence sharing process, the community 
must be re-engaged and leveraged in support of the fire service’s homeland security 
mission, current methods of response must be re-evaluated, and fire service leadership 
must articulate a new and more progressive vision to meet the needs of the post-9/11 era. 
Data collection for this thesis has come from continued research of existing fire 
service policy and procedure, surveys, and personal interviews with those individuals and 
organizations considered leaders within the fire service, and who have adopted 
progressive strategies and policies to meet contemporary needs. By engaging those 
recognized as progressive leaders, several things have been accomplished. First, and 
perhaps most important, a preliminary line in the sand has been established regarding 
how progressive this thesis can be without risk of being dismissed as radical. Second, 
profiling some of the policies and procedures that have been implemented by recognized 
leaders and that are working well establishes a best-practice base that adds greatly to the 
credibility of this thesis. Third, those who are “out front” addressing the fire service 
leadership end of terrorism have new ideas and strategies that should be considered. 
Much of the content of this thesis challenges existing norms and the conservative 
management that exists within the fire service. The discussions and arguments reflect 
“new thinking,” and use program evaluation methods engaging both summative (a 
quantitative measure of overall effectiveness), and formative (a qualitative measure of 
strengths and weaknesses) methods to reach its conclusions. This thesis concludes with 
strategic policy recommendations that advocate a direction for fire service leadership to 
meet the challenges of terrorism in the post-9/11 era. 
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II. INTELLIGENCE 
The fire service throughout its history has been a response-oriented discipline. 
Preparation and training has long been oriented toward traditional hazards, like fires and 
physical rescues, and more recently on providing emergency medical services, hazardous 
materials response, and various technical specialties like urban search and rescue, and 
swift-water rescue. Prior to 9/11, the fire service was in its comfort zone, managing its 
risks effectively and oriented toward response. Since 9/11, the rules have changed. The 
fire service has had to rapidly catch up to the threats it now faces. As it strives to move 
forward, it is no longer optimal to rely solely on a response-oriented posture. Like the 
lessons learned from fire prevention, in order to maximize effectiveness, the fire service 
needs to find ways to be innovative in its approach and open to change.  
Prior to 9/11, few outside of law enforcement paid much attention to the 
intelligence community (IC). At the local level, intelligence was often oriented toward 
vice and narcotics trafficking. Since 9/11, the IC has been widely criticized for its stove-
piped system and inability to share information. Furthermore, since 9/11 significant 
discussion has taken place regarding the need to increase homeland security information 
and intelligence sharing across disciplines and vertically within government. However, 
although there appears to be a desire to increase the sharing of information, a practical 
application to do so has not yet been widely developed. 
The information and intelligence sharing process in the United States continues to 
come under criticism at virtually all levels of government. This is particularly true at the 
local level by those who are tasked with planning, training, and response. Since 9/11, 
numerous documents have advocated increased information and intelligence sharing, 
such as The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,34 The National Strategy for Homeland 
Security,35 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.36 
                                                 
34 The 9/11 Commission Report, 417. 
35 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy, 2. 
36 108th U.S. Congress, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, 2004), 29. 
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Although progress is being made, we have yet to realize a truly effective and workable 
system. Despite a will to create an environment that prioritizes the need to share over the 
need to protect, some remain convinced that little has changed. In a statement before the 
House Subcommittee on Intelligence, Ambassador Ted McNamara provided the 
following, “we lack a national unclassified control framework that enables the rapid and 
routine flow of information across Federal agencies and to and from our partners in the 
State, local, tribal and private sectors.”37  
From a local government perspective, homeland security information and 
intelligence should take a prominent role in influencing planning, training, budgeting, and 
personnel safety through situational awareness. When trends and threats are not 
understood, planning, training, equipment acquisition, budgeting, and personnel safety 
decisions are managed blindly and from a position of having to prepare for every possible 
scenario. This is inefficient and ineffective. The mantra of “not if but when” the next 
attack occurs is heard throughout government. It is therefore highly important that local 
public safety agencies are properly prepared, trained, and equipped so they can manage 
any future attack as efficiently and effectively as possible.  
Often the term “intelligence” is used interchangeably with the term “information,” 
and it should be pointed out that there is a difference. Intelligence is an amalgamated 
product produced by someone who has the expertise and background to collect various 
forms of information, synthesize that information, and then draw a conclusion as to what 
it all means.38 By contrast, information is by its own definition just information. It is raw 
and unprocessed. Although this distinction exists, even governments do not always 
differentiate between the two, often collectively referring to both as simply intelligence. 
The purpose of this discussion is to not only acknowledge the difference, but also to point 
out that both have value to the first responder community. 
 
                                                 
37 Ted McNamara, (Ambassador, Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment), testimony  
before the U.S. House of Representative’s Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, April 26, 2007, 
http://www.ise.gov/docs/HHSC-20070426-%20McNamara%20Testimony.pdf  [Accessed July 21, 2007]. 
38 Lock K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz, Strategic Intelligence: Windows Into a Secret World (Los 
Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing Company, 2004), 2. 
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Commonly, intelligence is narrowly perceived to mean information associated 
with a current threat, and is therefore tied to a current investigation. That type of 
intelligence is often referred to as tactical intelligence.39 Tactical intelligence is 
frequently the least accessible because American counterterrorism culture places 
convictions and disruption of the event at equal importance. In these cases, law 
enforcement typically holds the information close rather then share it and run of the risk 
of compromising an investigation. When tactical intelligence does become critical, it is 
often shared with other public safety agencies and with political leaders. While that 
action is appropriate, it does little for first responders other then place them in a defensive 
position, waiting for the worst to occur. Although this practice is understandable, it does 
nothing to facilitate proper planning, training, equipment, budgeting, and ultimately fire 
service response and protection of the community. 
Besides tactical intelligence, there are two other types of intelligence that have 
significant, if not greater, value to the fire service: operational intelligence and strategic 
intelligence. Operational intelligence refers to an adversary’s capabilities and what they 
might do in the future.40 Strategic intelligence refers to an adversary’s future desired 
capability.41 Operational and strategic intelligence should be an important priority for the 
fire service. Although an event may have occurred in another part of the state, in another 
state, or on the other side of the world, it does not mean that the effects of the event will 
not influence the local community. If one knows what the enemy’s current capabilities 
are and what future capabilities he or she desires, then planning, training, equipment 
acquisition, and budgeting can be coordinated to meet those capabilities. Perhaps most 
important, if current and future operational capabilities have been addressed then the 
impact of any current threat will be minimized.   
As Mark Lowenthal, author of Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy notes, “The 
first purpose of intelligence is to avoid strategic surprise.”42 The fire service needs to 
                                                 
39 Department of Defense, “DOD Dictionary of Military Terms,” 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/t/index.html [Accessed July 21, 2007]. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Johnson and Wirtz, Strategic Intelligence, 2. 
42 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 2 ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003), 
2. 
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begin to consider issues beyond immediate response. Effective planning, training, 
equipment acquisition, and budgeting, driven by tactical, operational, and strategic 
information and intelligence, will keep fire service personnel from being surprised.  
An equally important concept for consideration is that the first priority of 
homeland security has been established as one of prevention.43 Above all else, the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security seeks to prevent attacks on American soil, and 
calls on all disciplines to engage in a strategy of prevention. A recent article in Fire Chief 
addressed this issue, stating, “The best way to accomplish prevention is prediction, and 
the only way to predict terrorism is through active involvement with the intelligence 
community.”44 
The role of law enforcement is paramount to the strategy of prevention, but the 
role of the fire service has not yet been clearly defined. This lack of definition for the fire 
service has resulted in a sort of organizational paralysis where many are not happy with 
the status quo, but have not been shown a direction in which to focus their efforts. There 
are, however, some key things the fire service can do to aid in the national effort to 
prevent attacks, and at the same time, further its engagement in the information and 
intelligence sharing community. One of those is the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) 
program.  
A. TLO PROGRAM 
The TLO program concept was created by the Redondo Beach Police Department 
in Redondo Beach, California, as a means to share homeland security information.45 Its 
basic premise is that both police officers and firefighters have uncommon access to 
individuals, businesses, and residences, and because of this access, they are in a prime 
position to observe people, their actions, and the local environment. With some very 
basic training, fire and law enforcement personnel may, through passive observation, 
                                                 
43 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy, 41. 
44 Rick Salyers and Troy Lutrick, “Best Defense,” Fire Chief  51, no. 2 (2007), 50. 
45 Gregory C. Hill, “Best Practices: Redondo Beach Mobilizes After 9/11 For Possible Terrorist 
Threat,” U.S. Conference of Mayors, September 8, 2003, 
http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/us_mayor_newspaper/documents/09_08_03/Redondo_BP.asp [Accessed 
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detect activities or observe materials that raise suspicion. When these situations arise, 
they can then make the proper notification to a designated TLO within their organization 
who can process the information into a standardized format and send it to the proper 
authorities for follow-up investigation. In the Redondo Beach concept, ideally each fire 
department and each police department would have at least one TLO.  
The TLO program represents the basic building block of an information-sharing 
network for local fire and police agencies as well as others involved in homeland security 
collaboration. The TLO program promotes the concept of formalized information 
pathways within organizations, and recommends defined points of contact where 
information should be directed. Furthermore, the TLO program promotes not only 
interdepartmental coordination, but advocates interjurisdictional coordination as well. 
Through the concept of a regionalized TLO program, fire, police, and other disciplines 
form both interdisciplinary and interagency networking capabilities where information 
and intelligence can be shared and disseminated horizontally and vertically within 
government.46  
Each department TLO becomes the point of contact with the regional Terrorism 
Early Warning Group or fusion center facilitating the coordination of information. In this 
manner, as threats are received and vetted, the TLO functions as the point of contact for 
the agency affected, and significantly speeds the dissemination of appropriate threat 
information. Since the TLO program was first conceived in 2003, it has spread 
throughout Los Angeles County with tremendous success.47 The TLO program is now 
being profiled as a model program throughout the country. During testimony before the 
U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Homeland Security in 2003, Captain 
Michael Grossman, of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, summed up the 
TLO program this way: 
The TLO program is based on a successful model implemented in the 
South Bay area of Los Angeles County, which has been expanded to the 
                                                 
46 Anthony Lukin, speaking at the Terrorism Liaison Officer Training Conference, Sacramento, CA, 
July 6, 2006.  
47 Office of the Mayor, City of Los Angeles, “City of Los Angeles Announces Homeland Security and 
Disaster Preparedness Initiative,” Press Release, February 2, 2006, 
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entire Operational Area (County). Every Sheriff’s station, law 
enforcement, fire, and health agency in the County has a liaison officer 
assigned to facilitate networking and information sharing within mutual 
aid areas in the county, and with the TEW. The Terrorism Liaison Officer 
program is also linked with the private sector through the Region I 
Homeland Security Advisory Council. The TLO concept is being 
replicated within Orange County and will further enhance the flow of 
information between the field to the TEWs.48 
Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca again mentioned the TLO program during 
his 2006 testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government 
Affairs:. 
One of the successful initiatives operating out of the JRIC is the Terrorism 
Liaison Officer (TLO) program. Originated shortly after 9/11, this 
program seeks to create a network of trusted agents within each law 
enforcement, fire and health agency in Los Angeles County that provides 
the vehicle to exchange valuable information to and from the JRIC. As a 
result, local police officers, firefighters and health professionals have 
generated numerous leads of “investigative interest.” This level of 
intelligence-based connectivity between field personnel is unprecedented 
and has enhanced the level of situational awareness in the region. 
Information provided by the TLO network contributes to the development 
of intelligence that is disseminated weekly to the executive staff of 
participating agencies, field operators, and line personnel.49 
The TLO program is a proven way that the fire service can engage in effective 
prevention efforts as advocated in the national strategy documents. Furthermore, and 
equally important is that the TLO program creates both a partnership and unity of effort 
at the local level, facilitating the exchange of homeland security-related information 
between local fire and police agencies.  
Information sharing between law enforcement and other agencies has always been 
problematic due to agency culture and standards of practice established by the 
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Department of Justice. Although firefighters and law enforcement personnel have a close 
working relationship, neither can fully comprehend the other discipline’s perspective and 
informational needs.50 While the TLO program will facilitate a closer working 
relationship, it will not erase all of the boundaries that currently exist.  
Law enforcement has typically relied upon the exemptions that are contained 
within the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to restrict information deemed 
sensitive.51 While the FOIA does not prohibit the sharing of information, it does allow 
for certain information to be protected from public disclosure. There should never be a 
situation where information sharing or the protection of an investigation takes priority 
over the safety of fire or police personnel, but there is information that fire department 
and even police department personnel justifiably should not have. In cases where the 
information provided could compromise an ongoing investigation, discussion should take 
place between the police and fire department TLOs to determine whether the need to 
know outweighs the risk of not knowing, or whether the information could be repackaged 
and disseminated in a way that provides maximum situational awareness.   
Law enforcement agencies will sometimes argue that the information they possess 
is classified and therefore cannot be shared. Information that is considered classified is 
available only to those who carry a “Secret” or “Top Secret” clearance from a federal 
agency authorized to classify such information. Information that is classified is protected 
from distribution under Executive Orders 1295852 and 13292,53 and cannot be shared 
unless the recipient has an equal or greater security clearance and a valid reason to have 
access to the information. 
Stated more correctly, law enforcement-restricted information typically refers to 
non-classified “Law Enforcement Sensitive” (LES) and “For Official Use Only” (FOUO) 
labeled documents generated to comply with Department of Justice standards, the Privacy 
Act of 1974, and as described in the FOIA and its various addendums. Generally 
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speaking, the Privacy Act requires that written authorization from the individual be 
obtained before information can be released, that there must be a “need” to know the 
information being requested, and that the privacy of the individual must be maintained 
within accordance of law. However, within the guidelines of the Privacy Act, there are 
exemptions. Taken directly from the document under section 1.5 U.S.C. § 552a (b) (1) 
(“need-to-know” within an agency), an exemption exists that allows information to be 
shared within an “agency” on a “need-to-know basis.” Furthermore, the definition of 
agency is given “its broadest statutory meaning,” which is how law enforcement agencies 
are able to share information across departmental and jurisdictional boundaries. In the 
context of homeland security, there is no question that the fire service qualifies as a 
member of the “agency,” has a vested interest, and a “need to know” regarding 
information associated with possible terrorist activity. In other words, the exclusion under 
law is permissible. Information can be shared, but professional norms and culture too 
often prevent it.   
In an effort to look beyond the current paradigm of the United States’ system of 
information and intelligence sharing, a comparative policy analysis was completed to see 
if there are more effective systems in place in other countries, what makes them 
successful, and whether they could be applied in the United States. As a basis for this 
comparative analysis, three other Western-oriented liberal democracies were studied: 
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. These countries were chosen primarily 
because they face similar threats to that of the United States, and because they are 
English speaking, which allowed for ease of finding information.  
B. POLICY QUESTIONS 
1. What policies should be considered to increase the information and 
intelligence capabilities of the fire service in the homeland security 
(terrorism) domain? 
2. Are there best practices being used in other countries that could be adapted 
to the U.S., and that would help facilitate increased information and 
intelligence sharing? 
3. What limitations are in place within the U.S. that cannot be reconciled?  
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C. SCOPE    
The goal of this study was to conduct a comparative policy analysis to see if there 
is information and intelligence sharing best practices from other countries that could be 
applied to the United States. In consideration of the other countries studied, their merits 
and shortcomings must be weighed carefully, keeping in mind that each country has 
unique threats, legal systems, intelligence apparatus, and interdisciplinary/interagency 
professional norms. What works in one country may not work in another. Any 
recommendations will be tempered by the conditions that exist within the United States 
today.  
This comparative policy analysis was designed to seek out best practices for 
possible application to the U.S. system. It was not intended to be a comprehensive study 
of each country’s intelligence, legal, and political systems. Where a best practice was 
found, it was noted. When a roadblock was found, that was noted. Neither positive nor 
negative findings are intended to suggest that that is the exclusive practice throughout the 
country being discussed; there are always exceptions.   
Much of the information provided discusses policy and standards of practice at 
the national level. It is included because those policies and standards of practice set the 
stage, and ultimately influence state and local government. Furthermore, this policy will 
not deal with information and intelligence that is classified as, Secret or Top Secret by the 
U.S. government. The scope of the discussion here will be limited to information and 
intelligence that is considered within the U.S. system as LES or FOUO.     
Last, the focus of this discussion and ultimate policy recommendations have been 
developed for fire service use. However, its contents and implementation cannot be solely 
oriented toward the fire service. Consideration must also be given to the needs of local 
law enforcement. Any policy recommendation will require a fire/police partnership in 





D. COUNTRY PROFILES 
1. Australia 
The central, guiding counterterrorism document in Australia is the National 
Counter-Terrorism Plan (NCTP). Developed and updated every three years by the 
National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC), the plan outlines the responsibilities, 
authorities, and the mechanisms to prevent, or if they occur, manage acts of terrorism and 
their consequences within Australia. According to the plan, “The Australian Government 
and State and Territory governments, departments and agencies acting to prevent, 
respond to, investigate or manage the consequences of terrorism in Australia will base 
their plans on the NCTP.” 54 
Although the NCTP does not specifically mention the fire service in any portion 
of the document, there are some references to information sharing that would clearly 
pertain to them. Included within the plan are statements such as, “maintain effective 
arrangements for sharing appropriate intelligence and information between all relevant 
agencies in all jurisdictions” and, “The Police Forward Commander will, in accordance 
with local procedures, exercise control over, and share information with, other 
responding services.”55 Also contained within the plan are statements confirming 
information sharing between the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), 
Australian Federal Police (AFP), local police, and the private sector. 
A companion document to the NCTP is the National Counter-Terrorism 
Handbook which is simply referred to as The Handbook. The Handbook serves as a 
bridge between policy and practice in the Australian system. The Handbook outlines roles 
and responsibilities, processes, and procedures to ensure that the Australian 
counterterrorism policy is implemented. Contained within The Handbook are numerous 
references to the fire service, information sharing, and the collaboration that must take 
place at the local level. (Note: The Handbook is a restricted document, therefore, excerpts 
will not be provided in this document)    
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The lead intelligence agency in Australia is the ASIO. Its roles and 
responsibilities include both foreign and domestic intelligence collection and analysis, 
but its principal mission is to prevent terrorist attacks on Australian soil. As the primary 
counterterrorism advisory and investigative agency in Australia, most of the ASIO 
documents are classified. However, the organization does produce an annual report that 
discusses the previous year’s activities, and there are references within the latest report 
regarding information sharing. Unfortunately, only one reference is made in the 2005-
2006 report that would infer sharing with local government. The report contains the 
statement, “As a member of the NCTC, ASIO participates in the coordination of 
Australia’s national counter-terrorism arrangements by contributing to strategic policy 
advice, development of an effective nation-wide counter-terrorism capability, and 
ensuring effective arrangements are in place for sharing relevant security intelligence 
between agencies and jurisdictions.”56 It is interesting to note that there are six references 
to information sharing within the plan, but none reference the fire service or local 
government, and the other five reference information sharing between the ASIO and the 
private sector. 
As part of its duties, the ASIO also operates the National Threat Assessment 
Center (NTAC). The NTAC was formed as a coordinating body to consolidate threat 
information, and distribute that information to the various governmental bodies to ensure 
they take the appropriate steps to counter current threats. According to the National 
Counter-Terrorism Plan, information provided by the NTAC is to “insure that 
Jurisdictions use relevant intelligence information, the national counter-terrorism alert 
level and risk assessment to determine the appropriate security responses for specific 
sectors, events or individuals within their jurisdictions.”57 
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The AFP is also engaged in counterterrorism activities within Australia. The 
ASIO does not have the powers of arrest, and so it works closely with the AFP, which 
provides enforcement and the powers of arrest. The AFP also produces an annual report 
that discusses the previous year’s activities. Although there are 19 references to 
information sharing contained within the AFP’s 2005-2006 annual report, none refer to or 
even infer that the fire service is included. Most references to information sharing refer to 
law enforcement agencies or to the private sector.   
In Australia, the fire service and police are organized on a statewide basis. In New 
South Wales (NSW), the largest state in Australia, the New South Wales Fire Brigades 
(NSWFB) and the New South Wales Police Force (NSWPF) have developed a strong 
working relationship. Although there is no mention of information sharing or 
collaboration with the fire service on the NSW police Web portal, there is significant 
information sharing that takes place. According to Superintendent Steven Baker, manager 
of counterterrorism and aviation for the NSWFB, the police, fire, and health departments 
collaborate fully. Baker, who is embedded with the police, said, “We work closely 
together because that is what needs to be done. Information from the police is forwarded 
on a need-to-know basis, and this arrangement works effectively.”58 Baker stated that 
there currently are no local policies on how information and intelligence is being shared, 
but that he is currently writing a position description for that purpose. The document was 
not ready for release at the time of this writing. 
From a law enforcement perspective, the system is working well. According to 
Inspector John Stapleton of the New South Wales Police Counter Terrorism and Special 
Tactics Command, the information he receives through the various governmental portals 
is sufficient for his needs. Stapleton stated that, “working with fire and ambulance 
representatives is not a problem” and that “overall the system works quite well.”59 
Stapleton attributes the effectiveness of the Australian system to smaller government 
overall, and a realization that each discipline has a need to participate. 
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In sum, there is a lack of reference in any policy documents that relate the need to 
share information with the fire service. In fact, there is no mention of the fire service at 
all. Although there is apparent intent at the federal level to include local fire service 
authorities, there is a noticeable policy void within the ASIO, NTAC, and AFP to 
acknowledge the need for the fire service to be included within the information and 
intelligence stream. However, despite the void and perhaps because of The Handbook, at 
least in New South Wales, that collaboration is taking place and is working well.  
2. Canada 
The central, guiding counterterrorism document in Canada is Securing an Open 
Society: Canada’s National Security Policy.60 Securing an Open Society is the first 
document developed that articulates the current Canadian policy on terrorism, and 
provides a vision of how it will evolve in the future. Contained within the plan are 
numerous references to information and intelligence sharing. Most references point to the 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), or to law enforcement. Again, there is no 
reference to the fire service anywhere in the document. However, there are references to 
public safety, and broader statements like the one below that would surely include the fire 
service. 
The evolving threat to Canadians requires a fully integrated government 
approach that ensures that issues and information do not fall between the 
different parts of our security system. This system needs to be fully 
connected to key partners—provinces, territories, communities, first line 
responders, the private sector and Canadians.61 
The lead intelligence agency in Canada is the CSIS. Similar to the ASIO, the roles 
and responsibilities of the CSIS include both foreign and domestic intelligence collection 
and analysis, but its principle mission is to prevent terrorist attacks on Canadian soil. 
According to the CSIS Web site “Sharing intelligence and cooperation, both at the 
national and international levels, is essential to effectively gauge current and future 
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threats to the security of Canada and to analyze terrorist trends.”62 To facilitate that 
process, the CSIS conducts threat assessments, and distributes that information through 
its Government Liaison Unit and through the Integrated Threat Assessment Center 
(ITAC).63 Most processed intelligence products are distributed through the ITAC. 
According to the ITAC Web page, “ITAC produces threat assessments for the 
Government of Canada, which are distributed within the intelligence community and to 
relevant first responders, such as law enforcement.”64 Again there is no direct, reference 
or recommendation to include the fire service.    
Because the CSIS does not have the powers of arrest, it maintains a close 
relationship with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The RCMP is a 
federalized police force throughout Canada, and engages heavily in domestic 
counterterrorism intelligence. The RCMP and local police provide the power of arrest for 
the CSIS. The RCMP produces an annual performance report that discusses its operations 
and defines the work plan for the coming year. Included with the most current report are 
numerous references to information and intelligence sharing. The RCMP philosophy and 
policy is summed up well by the following excerpt.  “It is critical that the RCMP be able 
to share relevant and timely information with its domestic and international partners 
including: Canadian police agencies; Law enforcement and security agencies; 
International agencies; Canadian Justice Community and Public sectors.”65 This concept 
is further expanded under its Strategies and Plans Section, which states one of the work 
plans for the coming year is to “Expand the collection and sharing of information and 
intelligence.”66 
The RCMP report also contains a self-assessment report on its information and 
intelligence sharing process. Included within the latest report is a separate report titled, 
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“Key Performance Results on Terrorism–Survey Results concerning the RCMP’s 
Information and Intelligence.”  The report is a measure of how outside agencies rate the 
information and intelligence sharing process by the RCMP. The results include the 
following:67 
Agree it was comprehensive: 
2005 – 59% 
2006 – 58% 
Agree it was accurate: 
2005 – 66% 
2006 – 62% 
Agree it was timely: 
2005 – 57% 
2006 – 53% 
Although the RCMP report indicates a strong commitment to information and 
intelligence sharing, its self-assessment tool is meagerly hovering around the 60 percent 
satisfaction rate. Additionally, it is not clear exactly who was included in the survey, but 
there is no mention of the fire service in any portion of the report. 
The Canadian provinces are set up similarly to the states in the U.S., and within 
each province there are individual fire and police service providers. The measure of the 
Canadian system must in part be determined by its end users–the local fire and police 
agencies. According to Deputy Chief Bob Smith of the Vancouver Fire Department, 
“nothing comes from the feds.”68 Smith went on to explain that the only information 
received by his department comes from informal relationships with the RCMP, which is 
representative of all fire service agencies across Canada.69 
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In sum, there is a lack of reference in any Canadian policy documents that 
articulate the need to share information with the fire service. In fact, there is a lack of 
mention of the fire service at all. Although there is apparent intent at the federal level to 
include local fire service authorities, there is a noticeable policy void within the CSIS, 
ITAC, and RCMP to acknowledge the need for the fire service to be included in the 
information and intelligence stream. This void is highlighted by the remarks of the 
Vancouver British Columbia Fire Administration, that despite references in many of the 
national documents, a desire for more information remains at the local level. 
3. United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom (UK) the overarching counterterrorism strategy can be 
found in a document titled Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s 
Strategy.70  Dated July 2006, this is the most current open-source document available that 
defines the UK approach to terrorism. Unlike the Australian and Canadian documents, 
the UK gives little mention to information sharing. In all, there are only two references to 
sharing information and intelligence within the UK documented strategy. The first 
references a desire to improve intelligence sharing in support of border operations.71 The 
second reference acknowledges a need to share intelligence with other governments.72    
The role of domestic intelligence collection and analysis within the UK falls on 
the Security Service, also known as MI5. The roles and responsibilities of MI5 are 
defined in the Security Service Act of 1989. In brief, MI5’s functions are “to protect 
national security against the threat of terrorism, to safeguard the economic well-being of 
the UK, and to act in support of police and other law enforcement agencies.”73 A search 
of the open-source documents and laws that regulate MI5 did not reveal any references to 
information or intelligence.74 A request was made through the public access portal of 
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MI5 to speak with a public information officer or government liaison officer. The request 
was denied. Instead an email was returned that directed all open-source document, policy, 
and intergovernmental-related questions to the MI5 Web site. However, no policy or 
reference documents are contained there. 
Like Australia and Canada, the UK also operates a multidisciplinary, all-source 
threat information center called the Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC). According 
to a document titled National Intelligence Machinery, the “JTAC sets threat levels and 
issues timely threat warnings as well as more in-depth reports on trends, terrorist 
networks and capabilities for a wide range of customers. JIC (Joint Intelligence 
Committee) assessments of terrorism are more strategic and place JTAC assessments in a 
broader geopolitical context for Ministers and senior officials.”75 The threat levels and 
warnings that the JTAC establishes are very similar to the color-coded Homeland 
Security Advisory System used in the U.S. However, the warnings are designed to target 
the public, not the response community. Furthermore, the reference of JTAC assessments 
being used in a broader geopolitical context for ministers and senior officials suggests 
that local authorities would not be included. 
As with the other countries, the ultimate assessment of information and 
intelligence sharing must be gauged by the end user. As a means to determine whether 
the UK fire services actually do receive the information and intelligence they need, the 
London Metropolitan Police and London Fire Brigades were contacted. According to 
Counterterrorism Security Advisor Nick Goldby, of the New Scotland Yard, “a senior 
member of the London Fire Brigade is embedded with the Metropolitan Police 
Counterterrorism Unit and he has access to all of the systems.”76 That assessment was 
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the United Kingdom’s fire representative for the Counterterrorist Command and who is 
embedded with Goldby at the New Scotland Yard, “everything that the police get, I get 
also.”77   
Further discussion with Simpson revealed that in the years immediately after 9/11, 
the UK suffered from many of the same inadequate information and intelligence sharing 
problems seen in the U.S., that is stove-piped systems and cultural differences prohibited 
information sharing. To correct the problems in the UK, Parliament passed the Civil 
Contingencies Act of 2004, which carries the force of law and mandates that agencies 
share information. Contained within the Act is an entire chapter (Chapter 3) that 
describes exactly how information is to be shared, and how sensitive information must be 
protected. Chapter 3 begins with the phrase “Under the Civil Contingencies Act, 
Category 1 and 2 responders have a duty to share information with other Category 1 and 
2 responders.”  
In sum, open-source policies and documents in the United Kingdom are limited. 
At the strategic level, there is little reference to information sharing, and that holds true 
throughout the government in the UK. However, despite the void that exists in the open-
source policy documents, the Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 corrects that oversight, and 
requires that information and intelligence be shared vertically and horizontally within the 
UK system.   
4. United States 
The U.S. strategy on terrorism is incorporated into several documents, but the 
overarching strategy is The National Strategy for Homeland Security.78 The commitment 
to information sharing is repeated throughout the document in such phrases as, “The 
federal government must seek to utilize state and local knowledge about their 
communities and then share relevant information with the state and local entities 
positioned to act on it.”79 There is also the acknowledgement that information sharing is 
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less than optimal at the state and federal levels. The U.S. national strategy states that 
“Information-sharing capabilities are similarly deficient at the state and local levels.”80 
Likewise, it also begins the process of remedying the situation by stating, “The 2003 
budget proposed an increase in spending of $722 million on programs that will use 
information technology to more effectively share information and intelligence 
horizontally (between federal agencies) and vertically (between federal, state, and local 
governments).”81 
The U.S. national strategy is clearly devoted to sharing information and 
intelligence vertically and horizontally within government. Yet there is one element of 
concern. The fire service is only mentioned one time in the entire national strategy.82 
Given that the fire service will likely be the lead response agency in nine of the fifteen 
National Planning Scenarios, this is distressing. 
In 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. 
This act reaffirms the federal government’s desire to maximize its information and 
intelligence information sharing capabilities. In the section titled Information Sharing, the 
following statement is made, “The President shall, through the structures described in 
subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (1), ensure that the ISE (information sharing 
environment) provides and facilitates the means for sharing terrorism information among 
all appropriate Federal, State, local, and tribal entities.”83 Within the U.S., it seems clear 
that information and intelligence sharing is desired, and that the current state of capability 
has not reached an optimal level. 
The responsibility for domestic intelligence activities are, for the most part, 
shared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DHS. Since the attacks of 9/11, 
the FBI has committed itself to a much more open posture. Numerous references are 
made in open-source FBI documents and policies to increased information sharing and 
collaboration. Statements such as, “Consistent with the protection of sensitive sources 
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and methods and the protection of privacy rights, we now share as a rule, and withhold by 
exception.”84 In another example, the statement, “Understanding that we cannot defeat 
terrorism without strong partnerships, we have enhanced the level of coordination and 
information sharing with state and municipal law enforcement personnel” articulates the 
commitment.85 
The Department of Homeland Security seems equally committed to the practice 
of information and intelligence sharing. Taken from its Web site is the following: 
Department of Homeland Security is responsible for assessing the nation’s 
vulnerabilities. It takes the lead in evaluating vulnerabilities and 
coordinating with other federal, state, local, and private entities to ensure 
the most effective response. The collection, protection, evaluation and 
dissemination of information to the American public, state and local 
governments and the private sector is central to this task.86 
What is absent from these documents is a mechanism for information and 
intelligence sharing to take place. In the FBI and DHS documents numerous references 
are made regarding information sharing and the fire service, but those two terms are 
never found conjointly. Like the Australian, Canadian, and British governments, the U.S. 
also operates a national fusion center–the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The 
mission of the NCTC is to serve as a collection and analysis point for all counterterrorism 
intelligence efforts. Its principal purpose is to “serve as the central and shared knowledge 
bank on terrorism information.”87 The NCTC also “provides all-source intelligence 
support to government-wide counterterrorism activities.”88 What the NCTC does not do 
is mention anything specific about supporting local government. In a self-assessment 
document titled NCTC and Information Sharing: Five Years Since 9/11, A Progressive 
Report, a reference to the challenges of information sharing is made regarding access to 
information by state, local, and tribal governments. The reference states, “methods for 
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ensuring that homeland security and terrorism information is shared among non-Federal 
government entities and the Federal government remains inadequate.”89 
E. SUMMARY ASSESSMENT 
With the exception of the United Kingdom, each of the countries cited advocates 
information sharing in its federal policy documents. Regardless of what appears to be a 
desire to share information among disciplines and vertically within government, there is 
still a lack of acknowledgement in these documents that information should also be 
shared with the fire service. 
The Australian, Canadian, and United Kingdom operate under a different 
information and intelligence collection process than the U.S. The ASIO, CSIS, and MI5 
all function as pure intelligence agencies without the power of arrest. Instead, they rely 
on a federal law enforcement agency to enforce the law and exercise the powers of arrest. 
In the United States, both functions are incorporated within the FBI. Although there are 
different systems in place, there is no obvious reason that information and intelligence 
sharing would be affected either positively or negatively. In the Australian and UK 
systems, there is an absence of policy or documentation referencing information sharing. 
In the Canadian and U.S. systems, there are numerous assertions of information sharing. 
But in all cases, reference to the fire service is missing.      
Each of the three countries operates an information and intelligence fusion center 
similar to the NCTC in the U.S. Although each of the fusion centers advocates 
information sharing in one way or another, the fire service is not mentioned in any of the 
information stream references.  
As stated previously, the ultimate barometer is whether those at the local level 
receive the information they need. Of the three countries studied, only Australia and the 
United Kingdom indicated that they were wholly satisfied with the end result. Within the 
Australian and the UK systems there are differences worth noting. First, the Australian 
system of local fire and police agencies is aligned with the state system, as compared to 
the Canadian and the UK systems, which are oriented locally. Even though the fire 
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department in the UK is a federalized system, it is for the most part locally governed. The 
Canadian system is much like the U.S., in that its public safety organizations are under 
municipal control. The result is that there is less government to get in the way, 
particularly in the Australian system. That is not to suggest that whatever makes the 
Australian system work effectively should be implemented by one or all of the other 
countries, only that there are fewer layers to organize.  
The second and perhaps most important difference found in the Australian and 
United Kingdom systems is that they have developed other means to serve as a guide to 
define how policy will be implemented at the local level. In Australia, The Handbook 
converts policy into practice, something none of the other countries have. In the UK, the 
Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 mandates with the force of law that response agencies 
will share and have access to information and intelligence. This is significant, especially 
in the U.S. and Canadian systems, where there is a great deal of discussion on the 
importance of information sharing, but no national architecture to make it happen. 
 














































Australia YES NO YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Canada YES NO NO YES NO YES NO NO 
United 
Kingdom NO NO YES NO NO YES NO YES 
United States YES NO NO YES NO YES NO NO 
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F. COMPARATIVE POLICY ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS AND BASIS FOR 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
There is a defined lack of reference to the fire service in any of the strategic 
policies in the countries studied, including the United States. If the fire service is to be 
considered an equal partner in the fight against terrorism, it must be recognized as such. 
Formally identifying the fire service in key U.S. strategic national policies must occur. 
Although the U.S. and Canadian policies have the most references to information 
and intelligence sharing, the fire services in both countries are the least likely of all 
countries studied to receive information. This represents not a failure of intent, but 
demonstrates a failure of will over culture and practice. The fire service must search for 
ways to join in the information and intelligence sharing process, and should use the 
information it receives to influence planning, training, budgeting, and personnel safety 
through situational awareness. 
The United States, with sixteen officially recognized members of its intelligence 
community, will always have a stove-piped system to some extent. Even with the 
numerous documents produced since 9/11 advocating the sharing of information, local 
fire and police services will never have access to the same information that federal 
authorities have. Much of the information at the federal level remains classified, which 
falls outside of the scope of this analysis, and although some may argue that information 
at the federal level often remains classified unnecessarily, that reality will not change. 
However, there are processes available for fire service personnel to obtain Secret and Top 
Secret clearances if agencies so chose. Although there are some things that will not 
change, significant improvements can be made. And if desired, an information and 
intelligence sharing system similar to that of Australia or the United Kingdom could be 
implemented in the U.S.  
The Australian and UK models vary in approach. In Australia, further definition 
of how the policy should be implemented is accepted and is working effectively. In the 
UK, it took the force of law to implement a system that works. Given the need and slow 
transformation of the U.S. information and intelligence sharing practices, further 
definition of policy through use of a “bridge” document should be the first step to define 
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how information and intelligence should be shared with the fire service. Lobbying for 
legal mandates is always an option if policy reform is not effective. It should not, 
however, be the first course of action. 
Including the fire service in the information and intelligence sharing process will 
be a monumental task. Although it will yield significant benefits, it will be met with 
heavy resistance from the law enforcement community and the IC. As with most things in 
government, small incremental advances often reach the finish line ahead of grander 
plans. That said, the following policy recommendations are submitted for consideration.  
G. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Develop and Promulgate a New National Vision for the Fire Service 
that Places More Emphasis on Pre-Event Terror Planning 
The United States fire service needs to first and foremost move away from its 
traditional response-oriented posture. It needs to embrace the concept that in order for it 
to maximize its efficiency and effectiveness, it will need to engage more significantly in 
understanding the threats it faces, and develop more effective planning, training, 
equipment, and budgeting. This is a central concept in the Australian and United 
Kingdom fire services, and one that justifies the need for greater information and 
intelligence access. Since integrating into the information and intelligence structure, fire 
service representatives in both countries indicate that their pre-event terror planning is 
more effective. 
2. Convince National Leadership to Specifically Include the Fire Service 
in Public Policy Documents, Policies, and Strategies 
The lack of reference to the fire service in the public policies, strategies, and 
documents must be changed. The fire service will likely be the initial lead agency in nine 
of the fifteen National Planning Scenarios, yet there is little reference to the fire service in 
any of the national strategies. The same lack of reference was noted in all of the countries 
studied, and was identified as being problematic by those interviewed. Although the issue 
has subsided to some degree in Australia and the United Kingdom due to the directives 
contained in The Handbook and the Civil Contingencies Act, it has been a central point of 
discussion among fire service leaders.  
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3.  Advocate Engaging the Fire Service in the Information and 
Intelligence Process 
If the fire service is going to maximize its efficiency and effectiveness, provide 
the highest level of service to the community, and provide the greatest degree of safety 
for its personnel, it must embrace the advantages of participating in tactical, operational, 
and strategic information and intelligence. This concept was not only noted but was 
expanded upon by the Australian and United Kingdom governments, which moved to 
embed fire service managers with local police.  
4.  Lobby for and Help Facilitate Legislation that Defines How 
Information and Intelligence Affecting the Fire Service will be Shared 
Within the U.S., the desire is clear to maximize homeland security efforts through 
an integrated systems approach. Although the national leadership seems committed to 
this process, a void exists on how it should be implemented. A policy document clearly 
articulating how information will be shared should be developed, and the fire service 
should take an active part in its creation. This concept was discussed at length during the 
interview with Superintendent Simpson of the London Fire Brigade, who said that prior 
to the Civil Contingencies Act, the UK fire services suffered from many of the same 
information and intelligence barriers that are endemic within the United States today. 
Although it took legislative action to facilitate the required change, the London Fire 
Brigade now receives the information it needs. 
H. SUMMARY 
The fire service must engage in, and be a part of, the information and intelligence 
sharing process. The primary reason for intelligence gathering and analysis by any 
discipline is to avoid strategic surprise; the fire service is no exception. Furthermore, 
information and intelligence should significantly drive planning, equipment acquisition, 
and training. Although engaging in information and intelligence activities by the fire 
service constitutes a change in practice and culture, it is a transformation that must take 
place in order to protect personnel and provide the highest level of service to the 
community.      
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Resistance is going to be encountered from some members of the law 
enforcement community, who see information and intelligence as proprietary to law 
enforcement.90 Those individuals and agencies may argue that the fire service has no 
business having access to homeland security information and intelligence because it 
could compromise an investigation. They might also argue, albeit falsely, that they are 
legally prohibited from sharing information.  
The question of sharing information and intelligence is a cultural issue, not a legal 
one. The fire service is as much, if not more, of a target for secondary attacks as law 
enforcement, and there is too much risk to delegate personnel safety to a discipline whose 
primary focus is to protect its investigation and pre-9/11 culture. Information and 
intelligence sharing is a major component of the fire service’s ability to protect its 
personnel and the community. This challenge is one of leadership. Fire service leaders 
must recognize the importance of information and intelligence, and begin a dialog with 
their counterparts in law enforcement to make this change occur. 
According to the International Chiefs of Police (IACP), intelligence sharing is 
“critical to law enforcement and other emergency agencies capacities to better protect the 
American public”, and should be a top priority.91 The need for timely and accurate 
information is essential, and should be viewed as a critical mission for the fire service. It 
is the best way to manage our homeland security threats. 
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III. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 
In 1971, America realized it had a serious problem; too many people were 
threatened by the catastrophic effects of fire. President Nixon and Congress created the 
National Commission on Fire Prevention and Control to conduct a study and to make 
recommendations to reduce the risk. That study, America Burning, was published in 
1973.92 Two of the most strongly emphasized and frequently reiterated recommendations 
included in the report were to inform the community about the nature of the threat, and to 
engage them in planning to meet current and future needs.93 
Today, America faces a new kind of threat: terrorism, and in the broader sense, all 
of the man-made and natural threats that are associated within the domain of homeland 
security. Ironically, many of the core issues identified in the America Burning report are 
not dissimilar to the contemporary disasters we face with terrorism, i.e., a feeling that 
although there is a threat, “for most Americans it is a remote danger that justifies 
indifference,” that “tensions arise when public expectations exceed what the fire 
department is delivering,” that there is no “purely government solution for every 
problem”, that “because fire departments exist in a real world where a variety of purposes 
must be served with a limited amount of money, it is important that every dollar be 
invested for maximum payoff”, and that “planning should set goals and priorities for the 
fire department to meet the changing needs of the community.”94 Because of the 
similarities of the issues that exist in these two time periods, two logical questions arise: 
Will the same approach be effective? Will a partnership between the fire service and the 
community it serves enable the fire service to meet current and future demands?  
The concept of partnering with the community has been around for some time. 
For many years much of the accepted fire service management principle has existed in 
the book Managing Fire Services, 95 written by Ronny Coleman and John Granito. As 
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early as 1988, Coleman and Granito stated, “It is important to remember that the local 
fire department operates first and foremost within the local community and must be 
responsive to its needs.” Although not specifically stated, the inference is that a 
public/community partnership must exist if current and future demands are to be met. 
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, emergency managers at all levels of government 
emphasized the need for greater community preparedness. One of the most significant 
events that impacted that effort was the State of the Union Address delivered by President 
Bush on January 29, 2002, during which he called for all Americans to “serve their nation 
for the equivalent of two years (4,000 hours) over their lifetimes” by serving in the newly 
created USA Freedom Corps.96 The USA Freedom Corps is made up of several national 
service programs, one of which is Citizen Corps.97 The creation of the Citizen Corps 
program called for individuals to engage directly through volunteerism to improve 
homeland security within their communities.98 Within the Citizens Corps, five programs 
were created: Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), Fire Corps, 
Neighborhood Watch Program (NWP), Medical Reserve Corps (MRC), and Volunteers 
in Police Service (VIPS). 
The largest of the Citizen Corps programs is CERT. CERT was conceived and 
implemented by the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) in 1985. The basic concepts 
of CERT, as designed by the LAFD, are to train individuals to first take care of 
themselves, their families, their neighbors, and finally their community.99 The Los 
Angeles CERT curriculum includes basic disaster assessment, turning off utilities when 
warranted, extinguishment of small fires, basic first aid, basic search and rescue, 
organization of CERT members and other convergent volunteers during disasters, and 
collection of disaster intelligence that will support first-responder efforts.   
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Since 1988, the LAFD has trained over 40,000 individuals within the city of Los 
Angeles. Each time another disaster strikes, the fire department receives more requests 
from the community for additional classes, and the program grows even larger.100 The 
LAFD conducts approximately 200 CERT academies a year in various areas of the city. 
In addition, it hosts two refresher courses each year, with an average attendance of four 
hundred people per course. CERT members are coordinated through a system of CERT 
Councils that are aligned with the various city council districts.101 
The alignment of CERT within the political subdivisions of Los Angeles is not 
happenstance. The CERT program has created strong bonds between the political 
leadership of Los Angeles and their respective constituencies. According to Battalion 
Chief Edward Bushman, of the Los Angeles Fire Department, CERT is one of the highest 
profile programs within the city, and significantly raises the fire department profile in a 
positive manner.102 The link that exists between the community, the fire department, and 
the city is so strong that the mere mention of reducing its funding creates outrage in the 
community. The continued success of the LAFD CERT program demonstrates its benefit, 
not only to the community, but also the fire department and its political leaders.103 
In the wake of 9/11 and the president’s call for activism, CERT found its niche 
and went national. In January 2002, there were 170 CERT programs across the country. 
As of January 2007, that number has expanded to 2,646.104 The growth in CERT is 
evidence that individuals do want to increase their preparedness, and are concerned about 
homeland security within their communities. 
Programs such as CERT have proven themselves to be good mechanisms to begin 
creating the kinds of partnerships that are needed in the post-9/11 environment. 
According to CERT Coordinator Bob Jacobsen, of Whatcom County, Washington, “If I 
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could train all 170,000 of my residents in basic CERT skills, our community resiliency 
against natural and man-made disasters would skyrocket.”105 Jacobsen’s comment 
represents the potential successes and the remaining challenges faced by emergency 
managers as they implement and expand CERT programs. 
A key concept of CERT is that a better prepared community will be more resistant 
to disasters, and rely less on scarce public safety services.106 For the most part, CERT 
remains an accepted program that focuses on the personal preparedness of individuals 
and families at their home or workplace.107 However, the degree to which a community 
should train and rely on its volunteers is not without its controversy. The larger 
discussion of utilizing volunteers in times of disaster and managing their activities in the 
pre-event, event, and post-event scenarios is both complicated and to some degree 
contentious. The core of the controversy seems to be whether citizen groups actually have 
the ability to conduct emergency operations that will ultimately be a benefit to the 
community as a whole. Russell Dynes, noted disaster researcher, writes that traditional 
public safety managers have historically believed that communities are fragile entities 
that collapse in times in disaster, necessitating strong guidance and direction through 
official “command and control” mechanisms that have been stood up by recognized 
public officials in order to restore order from chaos.108 More recent studies have 
suggested that communities are much more resilient than previously believed, and that 
individual and group behavior will be predictable and effective.109 One common precept 
that emerges from Dynes’ studies is that individuals within the impacted area will 
inevitably join together and engage in rescue activities, fire suppression, care for those 
who have been injured, and provide shelter and other logistical support in times of 
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disaster.110 Acknowledging this, the challenge for fire service leaders is to develop 
effective ways to leverage community volunteers to support the mission of the fire 
service. 
When President Bush constructed the Citizens Corps initiative in 2002, one of the 
cornerstones of his vision was to create a “culture of preparedness” among the American 
public. The term “culture of preparedness” seemed innocuous enough, and most people 
within and outside of government took the statement at face value: Be prepared. But as 
the term spread and was used by other members of the Bush administration, namely 
Undersecretary of Preparedness at DHS George W. Foresman and Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Frances Townsend, the focus 
narrowed. The question that emerged was, “What does creating a culture of preparedness 
really mean?”  
In response, both Foresman and Townsend attempted to define the concept. 
During a September 2006 appearance before the Senate Subcommittee on Homeland 
Security, Foresman spoke extensively about the progress of creating a culture of 
preparedness, noting that, “A better prepared America will be achieved when 
government, the private sector, and the American people each do their part” and that “we 
recognize that our nation’s preparedness is a shared national responsibility.”111 This same 
notion of culture and partnership was noted by Frances Townsend in the Katrina: 
Lessons Learned report. Townsend’s discussion of creating a culture of preparedness 
says, “A new preparedness culture must emphasize that the entire Nation—Federal, State, 
and local governments; the private sector; communities; and individual citizens—shares 
common goals and responsibilities for homeland security. In other words, our homeland 
security is built on a foundation of partnerships.”112 It is clear by the statements of 
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Foresman and Townsend that they view creating government/citizen partnerships as 
being the key ingredient to creating a culture of preparedness.   
Both Foresman and Townsend advocate re-energizing the concept of a 
government/community partnership based on the understanding that neither can do it 
alone. The ideas of Foresman and Townsend represent a loftier view, that a shared 
responsibility must be imbued within the American culture if the United States is going to 
maximize its homeland security efforts.  
From the citizen’s point of view, there is evidence that these 
government/community partnerships are just what communities have been looking for. In 
late 2003, the Council for Excellence in Government, in collaboration with the 
Department of Homeland Security, undertook an ambitious task: to facilitate a dialog 
between citizens and government leaders on homeland security. The project visited seven 
major cities across the country, and engaged citizens and government leaders through a 
series of town hall meetings. The meetings were also broadcast live on local radio and 
television stations, allowing those at home to participate through an interactive poling 
mechanism. The town meetings were moderated but not restricted in subject matter. 
Numerous homeland security issues were brought up, discussed, and debated.  
At the conclusion of the meetings, both the citizenry and government leaders 
understood that there was much work to be done. To assist in sorting through the many 
concerns and suggestions received during the town hall meetings, working groups were 
convened consisting of leaders from the public, private, and non-profit sectors to begin 
the distillation process.113 
The final report titled We the People: Homeland Security from the Citizens’ 
Perspective was published in May 2004. It profiled many views of community 
participants and offered numerous recommendations for implementation. One of the 
cornerstone statements in the report was that, “The greatest resource the United States has 
for enhancing homeland security–which has been largely untapped thus far–is the 
American people.”114 The report immediately goes on to say, “Making the most of this  
                                                 
113 The Council for Excellence in Government, We the People: Homeland Security from the Citizens’ 
Perspective (Washington, DC: Council for Excellence in Government, 2004).  
114 Ibid., 17. 
47 
requires a change in outlook as well as public policies; in short, it demands a deliberate 
effort to construct a culture of preparedness that emphasizes an all-hazards approach to 
public safety.”115 
To communicate the participating community’s desired end state, the report 
outlines the following fundamental values and vision: 
The American people’s vision of homeland security is a dynamic picture 
of safety, freedom, and trust. Imagine people going about their everyday 
lives—enjoying their families and friends, engaging in productive pursuits 
in thriving communities, traveling to and from home, school and work—
with the self-assurance that stems from being informed, alert, and aware of 
their surroundings. The threat of a terrorist attack does not deter us from 
living life to the fullest because: 
•  We know that well-rehearsed and connected emergency plans 
are in place for schools, workplaces, communities, states, and 
the nation. 
•  We know where to get the information we need—radio, 
television, the Internet, telephone—from trusted sources. 
•  We have confidence that first responders and trained volunteers 
are communicating and working together to protect the public’s 
health and safety. 
•  We have confidence that information is being shared, analyzed, 
and used strategically by officials in law enforcement, 
emergency response, and public health across the nation and 
even the world. 
•  We have confidence that private information about ourselves 
and others is being collected and used strategically and 
appropriately in a fair and accountable process. 
This vision recognizes the “can-do” American spirit that meets challenges 
with optimism and pragmatic solutions. In such a society, our precious 
freedom is intact, accompanied by a sense of safety and recognition that 
security underwrites that freedom. How do we achieve this vision? 
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The answer is a dynamic leadership and collaborative action from citizens, 
communities, businesses, and government at all levels. Getting this right 
will not only increase our security. It will also strengthen our 
communities.116 
The report also proposes precisely how this end state should be achieved by 
outlining the following guiding principles: 
The homeland security enterprise should be: 
Citizen Focused–engaging citizens to set priorities, develop plans, 
participate as volunteers, and demand accountability in their role as 
owners of our government. 
Collaborative–requiring leaders throughout the enterprise to work 
together as never before to achieve results that transcend organizational 
boundaries and individual egos. 
Strategic–articulating clear goals and measures, based on an analysis of 
threats and vulnerabilities; creating coordinated action plans; employing 
pilot programs and rigorous evaluations to identify, refine, replicate, and 
share best practices. 
Innovative–pioneering new approaches, unusual partnerships, state of the 
art technology, and creative thinking. 
Trustworthy–assuring appropriate degrees of balance, transparency, 
limits, and openness to build public trust in the homeland security 
enterprise. 
Accountable–setting clear performance measures against which leaders at 
all levels can be held publicly accountable for specific results in specific 
timeframes.117  
Although each of the guiding principles is unique in its own way, the core 
elements suggest that communities desire a partnership with government, want to be 
included in the planning activities, believe there is value in innovation and creative 
thinking, and are willing to take responsibility for their actions. Furthermore, these core 
principles seem well aligned with the concept of creating a “culture of preparedness” that 
Bush, Foresman, and Townsend have so often mentioned. However, the vision that Bush  
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created has little chance of succeeding if local public safety officials do not take 
advantage of the opportunity and move forward with engaging the community and 
creating public safety/community partnerships. 
Some communities, however, have taken a progressive approach to engaging the 
public in planning activities. In King County, Washington, the King County Office of 
Emergency Management needed to update its Regional Disaster Plan. Rather than just 
meet with other governmental bodies, county officials decided to include members of the 
public, tribal entities, and non-profit groups in the planning process. The final document 
became a comprehensive, all-risk plan that included sections on training and exercise, 
transportation, telecommunications and warnings, mass-care, housing and human 
services, public health and medical services, public information, and finally a terrorism 
annex. As the executive summary of the plan points out, the plan details “who is going to 
do what among all public and private organizations.”118 
The King County Disaster Plan is one of the few plans that represent the interests 
of the public and private sectors, tribal entities, and non-profit organizations. According 
to Katherine Howard, emergency manager, King County uses a “command and 
coordinate” approach rather than the traditional “command and control” approach 
referenced previously in Dynes’ work.119 As a result of this collaborated approach, King 
County received the 2005 Achievement Award from the National Association of 
Counties for its regional approach to homeland security.120  
The concept of creating government/community partnerships has another 
component that should not be ignored. An article by Archon Fung, professor of public 
engagement and democracy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 
University, states that, “competent administration is only one part of dealing effectively 
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with shocks like hurricanes and terrorist attacks.”121 Fung finishes the thought by saying, 
“The other crucial ingredient is society itself. Families, houses of worship, community 
organizations, and other social networks form the fabric of support–what some political 
scientists and sociologists call social capital–that enables people to be resilient in the face 
of terrible stress.”122 Much has been written regarding the concept of social capital and 
especially so since the release of the book Bowling Alone, by Robert Putnam.123 Putnam 
discusses in depth the historical decline of social networks and disenfranchisement of the 
democratic process in the United States since the early 1960s.124 On government, Putnam 
bluntly states, “In the 1990s roughly three in four Americans didn’t trust the government 
to do what is right most of the time.”125 
Putnam and others have gone on the offensive to re-engage the community, and 
rebuild the social capital and trust in government they perceive is lacking in American 
society. Efforts such as the Saguaro Seminar, hosted by Harvard University, which 
brought together “33 thinkers and doers, including articulate leaders from all parts of the 
country–from coast to coast, from small town and suburb to the inner city–and from all 
walks of life–from government officials to religious leaders, from labor union activists to 
high-tech and business executives, from elected officials to street workers. All 
participants demonstrate a deep commitment to improving the infrastructure of national 
civic life.”126  
A product of the Saguaro Seminar was the creation of the Better Together 
report.127 The report discusses many issues, but two are particularly worth mentioning 
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here. The first is an assessment by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who in discussing the 
“expectations gap” referenced a quote by political scientist Aaron Wildavsky: “A recipe 
for violence: Promise a lot; deliver a little. Lead people to believe they will be much 
better off but let there be no dramatic improvement.”128 Placed in present day, 
Wildavsky’s assessment perfectly fits the nation’s preparedness efforts following the 9/11 
attacks, and then the subsequent problems of the Katrina response. 
Another product of the Better Together report was a consensus that “Government, 
the output side of democracy is composed of the institutions that are supposed to carry 
out our collective wishes.”129 Yet without engaging the community on homeland security 
issues, how should the residents of a community determine what their level of service 
should be? Although terrorist acts are low-probability, high-impact events, the public 
outcry in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina should serve as appropriate warning that the 
community will not tolerate inefficient and ineffective response, regardless of the scale or 
probability of the incident. Both of these statements, when contrasted to the public’s 
desire to be involved in the protection of its communities, should be a very clear message 
to local government leadership. 
Rebuilding social capital that has been destroyed by unmet expectations has 
tremendous implications, and will take time and nurturing on the part of government. At 
a basic level it will require rebuilding social trust in not only government, but also 
between individuals and communities. This will be no easy task. As Putnam’s book 
clearly describes, the public’s mistrust and disengagement from government is endemic 
at all levels. It is not just a federal issue, it is one that crosses all government boundaries, 
whether federal, state, or local.  
Although the concept of a culture of preparedness originated within the federal 
government, the purveyors of that legacy must be local government leaders because that 
is where the greatest interaction exists between government and community. It is where 
the rubber meets the road. Regardless of federal ideas, plans, and programs, all of them 
must ultimately be implemented at the local level if they are to be successful. Because of 
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this, local government must function as both the ambassadors for the federal system as 
well as the local experts in implementing policy. 
A survey of fire chiefs within the nation’s top 250 cities shows that they are 
somewhat reluctant to completely agree that a gap exists between their own homeland 
security response capability and what the community expects. Scoring a mean of 3.61 on 
a five-point scale with three being “neutral” and four representing “agree,” suggests that 
although they tend to agree, they are not yet strongly convinced that the community 
expects more from them than they can deliver. This is in contrast to such reports as We 
the People and Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned.  
That same survey, however, demonstrates that chiefs believe identifying and 
remedying capability gaps is important. Scoring 4.3 with four representing “agree” and 
five representing “strongly agree,” the chiefs believe that gaps between fire service 
capabilities and community expectations should be minimized whenever possible. 
It is unrealistic to suggest that the expectation gap can be reduced to zero within 
any community. There will always be some gap that exists because that is the nature of 
government/community relations. And, although community partnerships and 
communication appear to be the best possible solution to minimizing that gap, even the 
best of partnerships will have its limitations. As fire departments across the nation work 
diligently to provide the highest level of services to their communities, there will also be 
limits. Fire departments often struggle to meet daily demands, and fall short in times of 
exigent circumstance. This has long been a problem for public safety leaders, and was 
appropriately noted in the America Burning report.130 In other words, staffing was a 
problem then, much as it is now. 
Fifteen years after America Burning was published, the fire service returned to the 
report and attempted to evaluate its progress. The updated report, America Burning 
Revisited, found that staffing and resources remained virtually unchanged.131 Under the 
heading of critical issues, the America Burning Revisited report noted that, “Another 
failure in the area of lobbying is that the fire service has not worked with such other                                                  
130 National Commission on Fire Prevention and Control, America Burning, 31. 
131 Federal Emergency Management Agency, America Burning Revisited (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1987), 99. 
53 
parties as community service organizations and industry with whom they might 
productively form partnerships to bring greater influence to bear on public officials. 
Unless this problem is solved, adequate resources will never become available.”132 
The fire service in general is recognized for its planning activities. Tactical, 
operational, and strategic plans exist in nearly every agency. As a part of this planning 
culture, the U.S. Fire Administration has for many years advocated that fire service 
providers engage in the master planning process.133 More recently, the IAFC in 
cooperation with the Commission on Fire Accreditation International (CFAI, now known 
as the Center for Public Safety Excellence, or CPSE) has endorsed the accreditation 
process.134 Both the master planning and accreditation processes are used as tools to 
determine levels of service and capability. More important, both of these planning 
methods rely on community representation as an integral part of the process. Although 
master planning and accreditation are fundamentally more global in scope, the idea of 
using similar processes that are more narrowly focused on homeland security issues 
raises interesting possibilities for local fire service leaders. 
In the context of terrorism, many agencies continue to plan for one event, 
assuming that all resources will be available, and there will be a rapid response. What is 
not planned for is the possibility of concurrent or sustained events, or an event that occurs 
when resources are limited. In short, this is a recipe for failure. Most homeland security 
planning has been done without public participation. But as the We the People report 
clearly advocates, the public is ready, willing, and able to be a part of that process.135 
Returning again to the survey of fire chiefs, when asked whether positive benefits could 
be realized by including community stakeholders in a homeland security planning  
process similar to that of master planning, there was consistent agreement that it would 
be beneficial. Overall the chiefs’ response had a mean score of 4.06 with four being 
“agree” and five being “strongly agree.”  
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There are many potential benefits to including community stakeholders in a 
planning process for homeland security. First, the public’s desire to be engaged in and 
improve homeland security within their communities would be increased. Second, the re-
engagement of the community would begin to build lost social capital at the local level. 
Third, the formation of government/community planning partnerships would re-energize 
the democratic process. Fourth, the expectation gap that exists within communities would 
be minimized. And last, the planning process could result in increased community 
lobbying of political leaders to appropriately fund and staff fire departments in support of 
their homeland security mission.  
Community engagement should be viewed as a critical issue for the fire service. 
Since 9/11, the fire service has done a great deal in preparing for acts of terrorism. 
Equipment has been purchased, personnel have been trained, local agencies have 
collaborated and coordinated with each other, and emergency operations plans have been 
rewritten. But the one critical issue that has been missed, and which deserves further 
consideration, is the engagement of the community.  
This will not be an easy task for many agencies. Nor should it occur in a vacuum. 
Homeland security is at its core a local issue and should involve all appropriate parties. 
Most certainly at the local level, the public safety agencies, police and fire should be 
standing side by side, delivering the same message. Engagement of the community and 
unity of effort between the police/fire mission on homeland security will help to facilitate 
preparedness efforts more than any federal idea, plan, or program. 
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IV. RESPONSE 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the fire service rushed to assemble a response capability 
for future terror incidents. Although terrorism was not a foreign concept to the fire 
service before 9/11, few would argue against the idea that September 11, 2001 brought 
the focus and threat to center stage. In order to rapidly develop a response capability, the 
fire service looked for “off-the-shelf” solutions to manage chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) events. Because of the hazardous nature of 
CBRNE materials, and because most urban areas had hazardous materials (hazmat) teams 
operating under a recognized and accepted response plan, the quick fix was to place the 
primary responsibility of terrorism under existing hazmat protocol. This provided an 
immediate and appropriate response capability that fire service managers could point to 
as evidence that they had something in place to protect the community. 
In support of the fire service, and seeing the need to rapidly expand response 
capability, the federal government, through its Office of Justice Program grants, 
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), FEMA’s Assistance to Firefighters Grant 
(AFG) program, and Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants, allocated billions of 
dollars to purchase additional equipment. In 2005 alone, the HSGP and UASI grants 
totaled more than 2.5 billion dollars.136 Today, the fire service has a lot more “things” 
than it did before 9/11, but an argument could be made that the overall capability has not 
increased proportionally. As evidence of this claim, one has only to read through a 
random sampling of the myriad After Action Reports (AARs) before a common trait 
emerges: the same slow, methodical approach that hazmat teams have used to manage 
traditional industrial hazardous materials incidents is being used to manage a terror 
incident. In report after report, the evaluators criticize the length of time it takes hazmat 
teams to respond, classify the environment, and perform rescue. It is not uncommon to 
find reports with such statements as, “the first non-ambulatory patient was not 
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transported to the warm zone for more than two hours after the incident began.”137  This 
same report goes on to say, “The incident team did not have enough personnel to 
effectively extricate all patients from the incident area.”138 
The consequences of 9/11 and the rush to stand up some kind of response 
capability was warranted, without question. But now that the fire service is several years 
out from that event, a question could be asked regarding whether the response capability 
that currently exists is the best possible or simply the quickest fix that was put in place to 
solve the immediate need at the time. Furthermore, what would the answer be if fire 
service leaders took pause and asked the question: If a fire service-based terrorism 
response system were to be built today, from the ground up, while continuing to fulfill 
traditional needs, would it look the same as what is currently in place? 
In a survey of fire chiefs and commissioners, undertaken in support of this thesis, 
several questions were asked regarding terrorism response. The results suggest that fire 
service leaders are somewhat conflicted on the issues. When asked if the same response 
methods employed for a hazmat incident are appropriate for chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, and explosive incidents, there was little conviction in their 
response. Scoring a lackluster mean of 3.06 (neutral) suggests that fire service leaders are 
not yet wholly convinced that the current path of terrorism response is effective. Perhaps 
more clearly, when asked if a hazmat incident and a terrorism incident are the same, with 
the terrorism incident just being on a grander scale, their opinion was more negative. 
Scoring a mean of 2.53 (disagree) suggests they view terrorism incidents differently than 
traditional hazmat incidents. This difference in concept explains the lack of conviction in 
the first answer, given that most urban fire service agencies are following a hazmat 
response methodology for terrorism.139 
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Additional examples from the survey provide more focus on this issue. When 
asked whether a tiered response including operations level, technician level, and 
specialist level trained personnel is appropriate for homeland security missions, there was 
greater consensus and positive affirmation. Scoring a mean of 4.15 (agree), fire service 
leaders confirm that a tiered response capability is what most find appropriate. However, 
the answer to this question seems in conflict with why a pure hazmat approach is not 
readily accepted, especially given that traditional hazmat response doctrine contains all of 
the elements of a tiered response. The answer may be in the last question that was posed 
in the survey: Do new standards, such as the National Fire Protection Association 
Standard 472, Operations Plus, have applicability to the fire service?140 Scoring a mean 
of 3.65 (neutral/agree) fire service leaders tend to agree that an expanded scope for fire 
service personnel in dealing with hazardous substances is warranted. When the same 
question was asked of the leaders of the nation’s top 10 jurisdictions (based on 
population), the mean was significantly raised to 4.10 (agree].  
A conclusion can be made based upon the survey results and the AARs previously 
discussed that although traditional hazmat response has a place in terrorism response, its 
current configuration is viewed as less than effective. Furthermore, fire service leaders 
see value in expanding the scope and capability of first responders to meet the threat of 
terrorism. 
Recently the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) released its Terrorism and 
Disaster Preparedness Strategy. Contained within its strategy, the FDNY hinges its 
response concepts on four key elements: capability (what the FDNY can do), capacity 
(how much of it can be done), proficiency (how well can the FDNY do it), and 
deployment (how rapidly can it be done).141 According to the FDNY’s Chief of 
Counterterrorism and Emergency Preparedness Joseph Pfeifer, of the four elements 
contained within the FDNY strategy, most fire departments, including the FDNY do 
capability, capacity, and proficiency well. What is often failing is the fourth component, 
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deployment.142 Regardless of the capability, capacity, and proficiency a fire department 
may possess, if it cannot deliver those functions rapidly, they are of little value. Pfeifer’s 
explanation provides validation to the criticism contained in the AARs mentioned 
previously. When placed in the context that the fire service is first and foremost a public 
safety organization whose primary responsibility is saving lives, the fourth element, 
deployment, is critical. 
Underlying the concept of deployment is a fundamental flaw that often exists in 
local agency planning scenarios, which is the belief that there will be one attack, that all 
resources will be available, and those resources will respond in a timely manner. This 
issue is addressed by Townsend in the Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned report. 
Townsend writes, “the scenario does not anticipate one of the most demanding 
characteristics of past al-Qaida operations: multiple, simultaneous attacks. How much 
more taxing would it be to respond to multiple and simultaneous nuclear, chemical, or 
biological incidents?”143 When considering the possibility of multiple or simultaneous 
attacks, those agencies that rely solely on a traditional hazmat response posture, one that 
firmly enforces the policy that operations-level personnel only engage in “defensive 
operations,” demonstrate a failure of imagination, and places both the public and their 
own personnel at increased and unnecessary risk.144 
There are two fundamental problems with this mindset. First, a choke point effect 
is created. Although there may be hundreds of firefighters responding to an incident, if 
operations-level personnel are restricted in their ability to engage in critical activities like 
rescue and basic monitoring because they must wait for a special resource (hazmat) to 
arrive, then capacity is diminished. Additionally, this flaw in operational concept can 
easily be exploited simply by timing the attack during rush hour traffic. In highly 
urbanized areas, a resource just a few miles away could have significant delays simply 
because of traffic conditions.  
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Second, when considering multiple-attack scenarios, the potential exists that there 
will be no specialized resources available, or they may be severely delayed because they 
are committed to another incident. In this scenario, the remaining non-specialized 
response personnel are left with few choices. Either take action for which they are neither 
properly trained nor equipped, or wait for resources that are already committed to break 
away from other incidents and respond. In this scenario, capability, capacity, proficiency, 
and deployment are all compromised. These lessons should have been learned during the 
scourge of “white powder” calls that occurred across the country in 2001 and 2002. 
Resources were often committed to other incidents, resulting in a delayed response or in 
no response at all.    
When considering response to incidents that involve dangerous hazardous 
substances, deliberation must be given to the regulatory environment.  Since 9/11, a great 
deal of discussion has taken place on this issue. As a central point of reference, the fire 
service has looked to the Code of Federal Regulations under title 29, part 1910 
Occupational Health and Safety Standards, section 120 Hazardous Waste Operations 
and Emergency Response (commonly referred to as 29CFR1910.120 or HAZWOPER), 
and to the local branch of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) as 
the enforcement arm of that standard. Too often, fire service agencies interpret the 
standard at face value and apply it as an unwavering edict to all situations. In truth, the 
standard contains flexibility, especially in how personnel are trained. It should not be 
forgotten that the standard applies to all employers, not just the fire service. Because of 
the variety of situations that might be encountered throughout the spectrum of the public 
and private sectors, agencies, and missions, training must be provided in support of the 
anticipated tasks expected by the employer. The requirements for training are set forth 
under section 1910.120 (q) (6), “training shall be based upon the duties and function to be 
performed by each responder of an emergency response organization.”145 
Historically ingrained within hazmat culture has been the idea that operations-
level personnel are restricted to engaging in defensive operations only. However, under 
the HAZWOPER standard, the concept of defensive operations is to “respond in a 
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defensive fashion without actually trying to stop the release.”146 More specifically, the 
standard mandates that “individuals who respond to releases or potential releases for the 
purpose of stopping the release” meet the requirements for hazardous materials 
technician.147 Furthermore, “they assume a more aggressive role than a first responder at 
the operations level in that they will approach the point of release in order to plug, patch, 
or otherwise stop the release of a hazardous substance.”148 In short, there is nothing 
contained within the OSHA regulation that would prohibit operations-level personnel 
from providing a supportive role (such as rescue or environmental monitoring) in a 
hostile environment, provided they are appropriately trained and equipped, and they do 
not respond with the intent of plugging, patching, or otherwise stopping the release of a 
hazardous substance.  
This assessment is specifically defined within the context of terrorism response in 
one of OSHA’s standard interpretations published on its Web site. Dated November 24, 
2003, and titled “Application of HAZWOPER (1910.120) to terrorist and weapons of 
mass destruction incident responses” OSHA states, “Training requirements for all 
classifications of emergency responders are based on the duties and functions to be 
performed by each responder and are found at §1910.120(q)(6)(i)-(v).”149 The intent of 
this response was further clarified by Jack Oudiz, senior safety engineer for the California 
Department of Occupational Safety and Health Administration. According to Oudiz, 
“Employers have the right to determine how their employees will respond to incidents 
involving hazardous substances,” and “As long as there is training and equipment 
provided to support that response, and employers develop guidelines for their employees 
to follow regulating the response, they are meeting the intent of the standard.”150 As with 
any regulation it is important to understand the intent, not simply the text. 
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OSHA has provided even more flexibility to public safety agencies during a 
terror-related event. Understanding that life safety considerations for both rescuer and the 
public must be considered, OSHA is positioned to act as an advisory body rather than an 
enforcement agency. Contained within the same letter of interpretation referenced above 
is the following clarification:  
With regard to terrorist events, OSHA’s role will be guided by 
comprehensive national policies contained in the Federal Response Plan 
(FRP), the National Response Plan (NRP), and other legal authorities. 
OSHA may not be exercising enforcement authority if this is not the role 
given the agency by the FRP or NRP. Under the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, OSHA’s primary duty is to ensure that employers are taking 
necessary actions to protect workers from hazards on the job; enforcement 
of standards is only one of the means provided by the law to achieve this 
end and will not always be appropriate. While 29 CFR 1910.120 provides 
important information on protecting workers, OSHA’s task in conveying 
these protections through employer actions may most effectively be served 
following a terrorist incident through technical assistance rather than 
enforcement activity. 
When actions under the National Response Plan (NRP) are terminated by 
the Lead Federal Agency (LFA), or the response period evolves into a 
clean-up period where a terrorist event has occurred and there are known 
exposures to hazardous materials, OSHA can and will then take any 
action, including the enforcement of 29 CFR 1910.120 and all other 
appropriate standards and regulations, as necessary to ensure that 
employees are properly protected.151  
The interpretations provided above do not release employers from providing the 
appropriate safeguards for their employees, but do decisively confirm that in the post-
9/11 era, there is a need for flexibility in order for fire service agencies to protect the 
public and carry out missions involving terrorist events. This issue was also discussed 
with Oudiz, who pointed to the events of 9/11. According to Oudiz, “The problems with 
the response to the World Trade Center were not that the FDNY did not meet the strict 
compliance of the OSHA standard during the initial response phase, it was they did not 
take the necessary steps to protect their individuals in the days and weeks following the 
event.”152 
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Given the need by fire service agencies for increased flexibility and response 
capability, some agencies are developing and expanding their own protocols. Cities like 
Los Angeles are now providing all personnel with higher levels of personnel protective 
equipment (PPE) and basic monitoring capability, and have developed standard operating 
procedures for all companies that allow the immediate rescue of victims in a terror 
event.153 In Huntsville, Alabama, all district chiefs carry monitors that give them the 
ability to preliminarily assess the environment long before the first hazmat unit arrives, 
and have pre-positioned PPE at area hospitals to support decontamination operations.154 
The city of Chicago has taken an even more aggressive approach, and has entered into a 
cooperative agreement with the firefighters union and the IAFF to provide its 4,200 fire 
suppression personnel with the requisite training to meet the standard for hazardous 
materials technician certification.155 According to Hazardous Materials Chief Daniel 
O’Connell, of the Chicago Fire Department, “Terrorism is hazmat with an attitude and 
we need to ensure that our people can function effectively in that environment.”156 
Regardless of the jurisdiction, the need to expand capability, capacity, proficiency, and 
deployment is evident. 
Although some might argue that the fire service cannot prepare for every possible 
scenario nor do they have the financial means to be as aggressive as Los Angeles or 
Chicago, an opposing and perhaps more justifiable argument could be made that 
tremendous increases in capability, capacity, proficiency, and deployment could be 
realized with relatively little cost by simply broadening the base of operations. This is 
what drove the ideology behind the Huntsville Fire Department’s concept of operations. 
By providing advanced training to non-specialized fire department resources, especially 
in the areas of PPE and basic monitoring, organizations can go a long way toward 
extending their operational base. 
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In the spirit of broadening the base of operations as a result of seeing the need and 
realizing the limitations that the current traditional hazardous materials culture has on 
terrorism response, the NFPA’s committee on hazardous materials sought to expand the 
traditional roles of operational-level personnel. In doing so, it created its Operations Plus 
Standard. Operations Plus establishes a set of core competencies for operations-level 
personnel to function in the CBRNE environment. Although not technician-level training, 
this standard does provide for basic response to those events where increased levels of 
protection are warranted, environmental monitoring is necessary, entry into the Hot 
(exclusion) Zone to conduct rescue is needed, and decontamination is required. 
According to Greg G. Noll, chairman of the NFPA 472 committee, a working 
group was formed in 2005 to review the 2002 standard to determine how it could better 
meet traditional hazmat response issues and the new terrorism/criminal use of hazardous 
materials.157 According to Noll, one of the main goals was to combine hazmat and WMD 
competencies into one single document.158 Furthermore, identifying the need to expand 
the base of operations, the committee relied heavily on the flexibility contained within the 
HAZWOPER standard that allows the authority having jurisdiction to meet OSHA 
1910.120 (q) (6): “Training shall be based upon the duties and function to be performed 
by each responder of an emergency response organization.”159 
The new Operations Plus standard contains all of the core competencies from the 
2002 standard, including PPE, emergency decontamination, and product control, and is 
expanded to also include air monitoring and sampling, victim rescue and removal, 
evidence preservation, and illicit laboratory response.160 According to Noll, “1910.120 
was first implemented 21 years ago. The world was a lot different then. The new 472 
standard is much more appropriate for contemporary times.”161 
Although the new NFPA standard will officially carry a 2008 date stamp, it was 
presented to the NFPA Standards Council for approval at the June 24, 2007 annual 
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meeting, and has an effective implementation date of June 24, 2007. Although there is 
nothing binding about any of the NFPA standards, they are widely accepted as consensus 
standards and establish professional conduct and competencies for the fire service.  
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V. LEADERSHIP 
In many ways the American fire service has not changed much since its 
beginning, when Benjamin Franklin created the Union Fire Company in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, in 1736.162 The fire service continues to deliver its services through a 
series of decentralized fire stations and personnel that converge into a single unified 
combat force directed by a single commander through a hierarchal, top-down command 
system. Since its earliest days, this decentralized and distributed network has woven itself 
into the community in ways that no other organization has been able to do. This is, 
perhaps, its greatest success. Although individual firefighters are not often personally 
known, they represent a national symbol and an instrument of a community’s inherent 
safety.163 Few would argue that for more than 200 years, communities have relied 
heavily on the services provided by the fire service. 
The fire service has expanded its delivery of services significantly since the days 
of Ben Franklin, particularly over the last fifty years. Although the fire service began as a 
narrowly focused discipline created to protect communities from the adverse effects of 
fire, its expansion of services now includes firefighting, physical rescue, fire prevention, 
emergency medical services, hazardous materials response, urban search and rescue, 
swift-water rescue, public safety education, and most recently, protection against 
terrorism. By far, the American fire service delivers a more diverse group of services to 
the communities it serves than any other governmental agency. Although the American 
fire service has retained its namesake, its evolution into an “all-risk” service cannot be 
denied.164 Regardless of what emergent need an individual or community has, it will 
most likely be the fire service that responds and remedies the problem.    
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The transition to this all-risk posture has not come without its challenges. Fire 
service agencies are expected to provide an increasingly wider scope of services to the 
communities they serve, often without additional funding or staffing.165 Furthermore, 
because of the community’s expectation to provide more, fire departments and fire 
service leaders are being thrust into the public spotlight, where they are increasingly 
subject to scrutiny.166 This increased exposure cuts across the grain of fire service 
culture, which, as a discipline, has opted to quietly fulfill its mission and remain out of 
the public eye for the past two hundred-plus years. Even when faced with the current 
threat of terrorism, the fire service tradition and culture remain intact. 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Townsend noted that “the culture of our 
response community has a fundamental bias towards reaction rather than initiative.”167 
Townsend’s reference to initiative would suggest, at least in her view, that fire service 
leaders should be looking for new and innovative ways to meet contemporary demands. 
The statement suggests that Townsend is looking for leadership from the fire service. 
Returning once again to the survey conducted in support of this thesis, 
Townsend’s remarks are not necessarily foreign concepts to fire service leaders across the 
country. When asked if the traditional response-oriented posture that has historically 
dominated the fire service was appropriate in the post 9/11 era, there was indecisiveness 
in the response. Answering with a score of 3.17 (largely neutral), there was not a great 
deal of confidence either way. However, when the response was narrowed to the metro 
chiefs, although the difference was slight, there was perhaps a trend beginning to emerge. 
The metro chiefs responded with a score of 2.73, indicating skepticism that a response 
posture alone would meet the current demand. This question of fundamental orientation 
also had one of the highest standard deviations found in the survey (1.14), suggesting that 
there are many differing opinions on this issue. 
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Perhaps one of the reasons fire service leaders have differing opinions on 
homeland security issues lies in the structure of the fire service. Although the American 
fire service has an amazingly similar culture from coast to coast and from border to 
border, it is fundamentally a patchwork of independently operating agencies functioning 
under local control. As homogenous as the American fire service culture is, agencies vary 
widely as do the services they provide to the communities they serve.  
This patchwork of agencies often finds common ground among the issues they 
face. However, because cities and agencies vary so greatly, what might be an important 
issue to one agency may not be important to another. There are roughly 30,000 individual 
fire service agencies in the United States, and each is influenced by the local political, 
budgetary, and community-based realities that each leader must face on any given day. 
As retired Fire Chief Alan Brunacini, from the Phoenix, Arizona, Fire Department, notes 
“there is no national focus to the American fire service.”168 Given this reality, attempting 
to bring together a group as large and complex as the American fire service is, to say the 
least, a daunting leadership challenge.  
The importance of a national focus carries much more significance today than it 
did prior to 9/11, when the changes that occurred within the fire service could be fairly 
easily incorporated into the existing structure, while maintaining local control and 
traditional values. Since 9/11, the rules and mission have changed dramatically. The 
threat of terrorism presents a far greater potential risk to the community and to fire 
service personnel than anything it has had to manage in its history. Although most 
agencies are attempting to meet the threat, there are no standards to follow, and most 
agencies are left to develop methods they perceive as right for their local jurisdiction. 
This lack of unity and national focus was noted by Townsend in the Katrina: Lessons 
Learned report, which says “our states and territories have developed fifty-six unique 
homeland security strategies, as have fifty high-threat, high-density urban areas.”169   
Given the unique threat of terrorism, most agencies will have to rely on automatic 
and mutual aid assistance. As seen on 9/11, even the FDNY, the largest fire department in 
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the country, required assistance from outside agencies. According to Jim Broman, chief 
of the Lacey Fire Department in Lacey, Washington, the fire service needs to work on 
greater standardization so that there is better “plug and play” capability.170 However, 
nearly six years after 9/11 there remains no national fire service strategy on terrorism or 
even a collective vision of what is needed. According to Broman, many of the problems 
the fire service currently faces can be traced to one central issue—“that there is not a 
singular voice that speaks for the American fire service.”171 
The fire service is principally comprised of two professional organizations: the 
International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) and the International Association of Fire 
Fighters (IAFF). The IAFC membership is made up of fire chiefs and other executive 
officers. The IAFF membership is made up of rank-and-file members. Both organizations 
are very active, and influence the fire service on many issues. However, because the 
chiefs are the ones who must be accountable to the political body and to the community, 
and because they are the recognized leaders of individual agencies, it is the IAFC that is 
best suited for assuming the leadership role on the issue of terrorism. According to Chief 
John Buckman, past president of the IAFC (2001-2002), “we are the association that will 
determine the future of the American fire service”.172 Buckman appropriately notes that 
even the fire chiefs understand that they, through the IAFC, will determine the future 
success of the fire service.    
The IAFC has not been idle on the issue of terrorism. In 2005, the Metropolitan 
Fire Chiefs (Metro Section of the IAFC) developed a strategic plan containing six goals. 
Although not exclusive to homeland security, several of the goals and strategies had a 
homeland security focus, and addressed some of the salient issues. The strategic plan 
included such statements as, “develop a clear definition of the fire services’ role in 
homeland security,” “increase visibility and role of the fire service within the Department 
of Homeland Security,” and “develop political strategies that include providing allies in 
Congress with specific and clear recommendations for the level of participation of the 
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Fire Service in Homeland Security.”173 Unfortunately, the document is more of a plan to 
plan, and falls short of establishing a true vision or strategy. According to Keith Richter, 
chief of the Contra Costa County Fire Department in California, current president of the 
Metro Section, and member of the IAFC Terrorism Subcommittee, the document remains 
in its original form, and although it is more than two years old, it has not been updated.174  
Another effort of the IAFC has been to host a yearly conference to discuss 
homeland security issues. This effort has been underway for the past three years, and 
includes both fire service and non-fire service participants. From the 2006 conference, the 
IAFC produced a report titled National Conference on Strengthening the Public Safety 
Response to Terrorism and other Hazards: Report of Findings.175  Within the document 
are the goals and objectives: 
• Build understanding of and consensus on common preparedness and 
response priorities in the public safety community. 
• For the state and local public safety community to self-identify and 
articulate a common vision of preparedness efforts, particularly as they 
relate to HSPD-5 and HSPD-8. The vision should take into account 
which steps have been effective, what courses of action need to be 
redirected and what actions should be considered next. 
• Examine interoperability (and its relation to operability) in the context of 
critical preparedness and response issues. 
• Support the “all-hazards” approach by engaging the issues in a mix of 
contexts including malicious and non-malicious man-made incidents, 
natural disasters, and daily operations. 
• Support a “bottom-up” methodology to national preparedness efforts.176 
Not unlike the strategic plan developed by the Metro Section, there appears to be 
several issues in the National Conference on Strengthening the Public Safety Response to 
Terrorism and other Hazards: Report of Findings document which suggest that the path 
for the fire service in homeland security is not yet determined. More important, these two 
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documents suggest that there is a fundamental problem in approach. The IAFC and 
individual agencies are searching for consensus on which direction to take. But that is not 
what is most important. What is critically important and fundamentally necessary is to 
have a destination. No one has established that for the fire service. From a leadership 
perspective, a homeland security vision for the fire service must be established because it 
provides the basis for all that follows. Without a clear vision, how can effective strategies 
be developed if the end point has not been established? As noted leadership author Steven 
Covey would say, start with the end in mind. This concept by Covey is a vital component 
of leadership; “To begin with the end in mind means to start with a clear understanding of 
your destination.”177 Covey’s quote reaffirms the idea that it is impossible to pick the 
right path if the destination is unknown.  
As with any issue, it is always easier to find the problem than the solution. In the 
case of the IAFC, many people are working diligently to find those solutions. But in a 
system that might best be described as a complex network of networks that exist as a set 
of multifunctional groups or teams, finding solutions is going to be even more 
challenging given the current approach.  
As previously stated, the fire service is trying to manage a more demanding and 
dynamic environment than anytime in its history. Yet fundamentally, the fire service 
remains entrenched in its traditional firefighting-oriented culture rather than fully 
embrace its evolution into the all-hazards discipline that it has become. Evidence of this 
has already been discussed in various forms in the preceding chapters of this thesis, and 
will not be repeated here. However, given the changing environment, the ongoing threat, 
the current status of the fire service, and the years that have elapsed since 9/11, it might 
be suggested that traditional leadership practices are not meeting the current demand. The 
essence of this argument is that the fire service as a discipline must learn to be more 
adaptive to the changing environment. As a fundamental concept in organizational 
theory, organizations must evolve or risk being left behind to whither and eventually 
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die.178 Although there is little risk that the fire service will whither and die, it reinforces 
the often-forgotten importance that external influences have on organizations.  
In support of this thesis, several fire chiefs were contacted and interviewed 
regarding leadership. The consensus was that the focus must change from a localized 
view to one that encompasses the broader perspective. According to IAFC Executive 
Director Mark Light, “Whenever possible, the fire chiefs need to look beyond their own 
agencies and work at the macro level.”179 Reinforcing this concept and speaking directly 
to the issue of leadership was Chief Brunacini, who opined, “The leadership challenge is 
to find a way to bring resources to bear and coalesce in a common vision.”180 The idea of 
a creating a broader perspective and coalescing in a common vision has found its 
beginnings in a small self-initiated committee of the IAFC.   
Confronting the leadership challenge head-on is a small ad hoc committee of fire 
chiefs headed by Chief Jim Broman. The committee Broman chairs is working to 
establish a doctrine for the fire service that first challenges its very existence, defines its 
mission, and finally establishes its vision for the future. The idea was borrowed from the 
military, and answers the fundamental question, “Why do we exist?” Although the 
doctrine is all encompassing to the fire service mission, at least part of that doctrine will 
begin to establish a vision for the fire service’s role in homeland security. 
Broman and the others are diverging from traditional leadership methods and 
using the concepts of transformational leadership to challenge the status quo and establish 
a clearly defined path for the fire service, all the while identifying and promoting the 
vision from the onset. The five proven practices of leadership—challenge the process, 
inspire a shared vision, enable others to act, model the way, and encourage the heart— 
are being combined with transformational leadership to transcend individual interests for 
those of the greater good.181 In essence, this approach constitutes inspiration, renewal, 
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and an internalized sense of mission. The strength in transformational leadership is “the 
movement away from being over-managed and under-led, to an environment where 
employees pull together in pursuit of a collective purpose through shared governance, 
semi-autonomous work units, and leadership that focuses on facilitation rather than 
control.”182 As noted leadership author John Gardner states, “No individual has all of the 
skills—and certainly not all of the time—to carry out all of the complex tasks of 
contemporary leadership.”183 Transformational management revels in a sense of 
collectivism, but not the pitfalls of “group think.” 
The idea of transformational leadership was originally conceived by James 
MacGregor Burns. Burns stipulates that leadership can be divided into two fundamentally 
different types. The first type is transactional leadership, where Burns argues that its 
basis is founded on an exchange of valued things.184 This form of leadership is often 
practiced in fire service agencies and is most evident in the precept of management by 
exception (MBE). In MBE, individuals, groups, and agencies have little contact with 
leaders as long as they remain within established expectations of performance. Those 
who don’t follow the established rules are corrected. Fundamentally, transactional 
leadership is a barter system that establishes a relationship based upon the idea of, if you 
do this for me, I will do that for you. In the public sector, the reward may be promotion, 
reassignment, or some form of acknowledgement.  
In describing transactional leadership, Burns identifies its limited value because it 
does not extend beyond the bargaining process, and that once the exchange of “valued 
goods” has taken place, there is nothing that binds the parties together.185 More 
pointedly, “transactional leadership alone has been identified as a leadership style that 
promotes mediocrity because of its contractual focus on minimum acceptable  
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performance and its inherent focus on areas of failure or potential failure.”186 One could 
easily argue that the transactional methodology is more of a management tool than true 
leadership. 
Within the fire service and other emergency services, transactional leadership is 
common.187 In emergency situations, transactional leadership is suitable because 
outcomes are based on agreed-upon expected levels of performance (the exchange of 
valued goods) in order to meet operational goals.188  However, an argument can also be 
made that transactional leadership is best suited at the tactical level involving teams or 
groups, and may not be the best choice at the non-emergent strategic level of mid- and 
upper-management, where complex problems need to be debated and solutions 
developed. In the document Challenges for Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management: California’s Experience, the authors describe a transactional form of 
leadership during the Katrina disaster, stating there were many “bureaupatholigies” that 
came to light in “organizations with multiple organizational layers which stress hierarchy, 
and close adherence to the chain of command.”189 This discussion goes on to say, 
[M]any individuals are locked into an enduring “mindset”, the structural 
frame, that has its roots in the early 20th century in the writings of Henri 
Fayol, Frederick Taylor, Luther Gulick, and other seminal figures in the 
study of organizations. The language, concepts and premises of the 
structural frame are limiting, but they constitute “accepted wisdom” for 
many participants in the dialog on organization and reorganization. Indeed 
this accepted wisdom is habitually ritualistically recited as a litany in most 
organizational analyses of public organizations.190 
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The authors conclude that “a more comprehensive set of 
organizational/management frameworks and language is essential to achieving effective 
collaborative behaviors.”191 Stated another way, current leadership models need to be 
transformed. 
Most individuals in the fire service who have reached the mid- and upper-
management level and are responsible for leading and managing fire service 
organizations are familiar with the works of Fayol, Taylor, and Gulick. More specifically, 
much of the training that continues to be offered to individuals promoting through the 
ranks is based on the works of these authors. Their work is geared toward the tactical 
level, is transactional in nature, and represents management, not leadership. A study 
conducted in 1995 by Richard Gist and S. Joseph Woodall concluded that “Effective 
leadership in any hierarchical organization contributes significantly to organizational 
success. Yet most professional fire service officers in the United States have received 
little formal management training.”192  Those organizations and leaders who do not move 
beyond these basic teachings will likely find themselves and their organization limited in 
effectiveness. A study conducted in 1989 by Bernard M. Bass and Bruce J. Avolio 
concluded that, “If leaders were only transactional, the organizations were seen as less 
effective.”193 
The second form of leadership defined by Burns is transformational leadership. 
Burns defines this style of leadership as “a relationship of mutual stimulation and 
elevation that converts followers to leaders and may convert leaders to moral agents.”194 
More specifically, “The transformational leader asks followers to transcend their own  
 
                                                 
191 Richard Callahan, Dan M. Haverty, and Ross Clayton, Challenges for Homeland Security and 
Emergency Management: California’s Experience (Los Angeles, CA: IBM Center for the Business of 
Government, 2007), 13. 
192 Richard Gist and S. Joseph Woodall, “Occupational Stress in Contemporary Fire Service,” 
Occupational Medicine: State of the Art Reviews 10, cited in Randal.Beaton et al., “Outcomes of a 
Leadership Intervention for a Metropolitan Fire Department,” Psychological Reports 88, no. 3 Pt 2 (2001), 
1049.  
193 Bernard M. Bass and Bruce J. Avolio, The Multi-factor Leadership Questionnaire (Palo Alto, CA: 
Consulting Psychologists Press, 1989), cited in Bernard M. Bass, Bass and Stogdill’s Handbook on 
Leadership (New York, NY: Free Press, 1990), 218. 
194 Burns, Leadership, 4. 
75 
self-interests for the good of the group, organization, or society; to consider their longer-
term needs to develop themselves, rather than their needs of the moment, and to become 
aware of what is really important.”195 
The concepts of transformational leadership ultimately boil down to renewal of 
the heart, and the elevation of purpose to a greater cause. Transformational leadership is 
couched within the “Four I’s”: idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual 
stimulation, and individualized consideration. Idealized influence means transformational 
leaders behave in ways that make them role models for those they manage. Inspirational 
motivation means transformational leaders behave in ways that motivate and inspire 
those around them by providing meaning and challenge to their work. Intellectual 
stimulation means transformational leaders approach situations in new ways. 
Individualized consideration means transformational leaders pay attention to individual 
needs, and achieve growth by acting as a coach and mentor.196 
Much of the study on transformational leadership has come from the military. 
Given the complexity and changing environment of the threats faced, the military has 
been forced to look for new and innovative ways to manage and lead its resources. In one 
report, the conclusions were clear, “transformational leadership and subordinate use of a 
rational approach were the influencing behaviors most strongly associated with higher 
levels of leader effectiveness and subordinate satisfaction with the leader.”197  Given the 
fire service’s need for higher levels of effectiveness, an approach based on 
transformational leadership seems well suited.  
According to U.S. Army doctrine, “leadership is the most essential component of 
combat power or the ability to fight and win.”198 The applicability of transformational 
leadership in military settings has been called “especially effective in situations where 
followers and members of units must work together to coordinate their activities to take 
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on challenging, high-risk, and difficult task assignments, such as those characterizing the 
U.S. Army today.”199  This conclusion is based on the applicability of transformational 
leadership to “confront the vast array of new challenges already identified and those still 
yet to be determined.”200 Furthermore, transformational leadership is positively linked to 
the vision, mission, and culture of the organization.201 Although the above references are 
to the military, an uncanny resemblance to the fire service and the current challenges it 
faces cannot be denied. 
Given the challenges that lay ahead, the question may not be whether a new style 
of leadership for the fire service is applicable as much as whether the fire service can 
afford to reject new ways of thinking, managing, and leading. An article in Management 
Services offers some perspective on this issue. “The fire service is facing fundamental 
change over the next few years. Although it has experienced much incremental change in 
recent years, it may not be sufficiently adaptive to cope effectively with the radical nature 
of changes it now faces.”202 As Will Rogers once said, “Even if you are on the right 
track, you’ll get run over if you just sit there.”203 By applying transformational leadership 
principles, the status quo is challenged and an organized search for change, systematic 
analysis, and the capacity to transform organizations is realized.204  As affirmation of this 
concept, a study of 110 fire chiefs concluded that those who practiced transformational 
leadership were found to have higher degrees of effectiveness.205 
Understanding the need to develop new leadership within the fire service, Deputy 
Chief Kevin Brame, from the North Las Vegas Fire Department, and a small group of 
progressive fire service leaders formed the International Public Safety Leadership and 
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Ethics Institute (IPSLEI) in 2006.206 The vision of the IPSLEI membership was to begin 
development of leadership qualities in individuals early in their careers, rather than wait 
until a person was promoted and then hope the person develops the required leadership 
skills. An added benefit to the IPSLEI philosophy is that by targeting individuals early, 
leaders are created at all levels of an organization. This concept fits well with 
transformational leadership practices. The IPSLEI members also believe the key to 
effectively managing the fast-paced contemporary challenges of public safety 
organizations lies predominately in leadership, not in tools and technology.207  The 
IPSLEI vision is to build the leadership necessary to meet that challenge. IPSLEI is 
currently being piloted by the California Community College system, and is expanding to 
other states. It is also being considered by DHS as a model for a national public safety 
leadership program.208 
The fire service has not challenged itself by asking the hard question: Given the 
threats we face, are we trying to make the asymmetric threat of terrorism, and in the 
larger sense homeland security, fit into the mold of the American fire service, or does the 
fire service need to change in order to meet the contemporary need? The argument here is 
not one of one modality over another, but of method, leadership, and challenging the 
current paradigm. The concept of an all-risk environment cannot be overstated, and the 
current paradigm of the traditional leadership approach has not proven itself responsive 
enough to meet the current demand. A report by the Century Foundation, which conducts 
public policy research and analyses of economic, social, and foreign policy issues, found 
that there is “little evidence that states and localities had significantly improved 
protections for their residents.”209 Relying on the premise that the public will always be 
willing to fund a fire service whose leadership and tradition has an unbalanced focus on 
fire suppression—a core mission which no longer represents the majority of its activities 
and is being diluted by all of the other needs of the community—is a risky position. 
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Furthermore, the fallout from the Katrina response clearly shows that the public will not 
stand for anything less than an effective, efficient, and timely response to whatever the 
next disaster is, be it man-made or a naturally occurring event.   
In order to meet the contemporary need, today’s emergency service agencies must 
constantly re-evaluate and be ready to change management systems and leadership 
styles.210 Additionally, those changes must take place with relative speed and should not 
be bogged down in individualism and bureaucracy. Bass writes, “Conservative leaders 
tend to maintain existing political institutions and policies, reformist leaders promote 
moderate changes in institutions and policies, and revolutionary leaders strive for 
fundamental changes in institutions and policies.”211 The fire service is on the precipice 
of significant change. In order to meet that challenge, revolutionary leadership will be 
required. It will be up to existing leaders and the leaders of tomorrow to effectively 
manage that change, to meet the public demand, and to determine whether the fire service 
will continue in its proud and honorable role as a national symbol and the primary 
instrument of a community’s safety. And, at least for today, the concepts of 
transformational leadership are the best way to facilitate change quickly and effectively 
in order to meet the needs of the changing environment. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The fire service is living in a new paradigm of terrorism and homeland security. 
Now, more than any time in its history, it is faced with dynamic and changing mission 
requirements that represent profound threats to the community, and to fire service 
personnel. Although much has been done to meet the threat, there remains much to do. In 
the days, weeks, and now years following 9/11, the fire service has scrambled to build 
capability as rapidly as possible, and capability has been increased. But in its rush to meet 
the threat, it has not paused to critically ask the question: If the fire service could start 
from scratch and build a comprehensive pre- and post-event capability for the threat of 
terrorism, what would that system look like? This thesis has attempted to find the answer 
to that question, and has identified four critical areas that deserve consideration: to 
become integrated in the information/intelligence process, to engage the community, to 
reconsider response methods, and to promote leadership. 
A. INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE  
The fire service must engage in the information and intelligence process if it is 
going to maximize its service to the community and protect its personnel. Through 
effective information and intelligence management, situational awareness is maximized 
and strategic surprise is minimized. This involvement should include all forms of the 
information and intelligence processes, i.e., tactical, operational, and strategic. 
Furthermore, information and intelligence should be leveraged to support an agency’s 
planning, training, and equipment acquisition. 
There will be challenges to fire service agencies that engage in information and 
intelligence activities. Most of those challenges will come from law enforcement 
personnel, who falsely believe that this is strictly a law enforcement function. And, there 
will be claims that information and intelligence cannot be shared because of the legal 
restrictions that regulate that process. However, as discussed in Chapter II, those claims 
are largely false; the process of compartmentalizing information is one of culture not of 
legality.  
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Fire service leaders should not be lulled into complacency hoping their law 
enforcement counterparts will eventually see the need, and begin to share information 
and intelligence. It will take a determined effort by fire chiefs and other fire service 
leaders to make it happen. Settling for anything less compromises the protection of the 
community and the fire service personnel, who must provide protection against the threat 
of terrorism. 
Understanding that protection from terrorism and the development of true 
homeland security goes beyond information and intelligence sharing, fire service 
organizations should strive to form strong relationships and effective partnerships with 
not only their law enforcement counterparts but with other local government agencies and 
the private sector. All agencies need to understand that this is not one discipline’s 
problem. Terrorism, and in the broader sense of homeland security, must be approached 
from an interdisciplinary perspective with overlapping levels of responsibility and 
support. It must be viewed as a continuum rather than a process that starts and stops 
within agencies.   
The fire service, as well as other agencies and disciplines at the local level, should 
give serious consideration to implementing model programs like the Terrorism Liaison 
Officer (TLO) program to maximize information and intelligence sharing. The TLO 
program benefits agencies by defining designated points of contact within organizations 
and information pathways so that when information is received, it is processed 
accordingly, and the right people have the right information at the right time. For those 
agencies that have a need for increased levels of information and intelligence, individuals 
can apply for security clearances and participate in Terrorism Early Warning Groups or 
fusion centers. 
Regardless of the level of security access needed, fire service providers can 
realize significant increases in situational awareness, planning, budgeting, training, 
personnel safety, and ultimately, increased protection for the community. This can be 
achieved with a relatively small amount of effort by engaging in the information and 
intelligence process.  
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B. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT      
Leveraging community support for homeland security has been one of the most 
underutilized assets available to the fire service. For reasons that cannot be explained 
here, much of the community enthusiasm for engagement has been ignored by fire 
service providers. Although management theory has long held that where there is interest 
on the part of the community, budget support typically follows, this has not been 
routinely exploited by fire service providers, particularly within the domain of terrorism 
preparedness.  
This thesis highlights the CERT program as one way to engage the community. 
However, CERT is just a stepping stone that allows interaction to take place. The goal is 
to create a partnership between the fire service and the communities it serves. Through 
collaboration and team work, communities can better understand the risk they face, 
reduce the gap that inherently exists between what is expected of fire service providers 
and what they can truly deliver, and allows the community to determine the level of 
service it should receive. Furthermore, as the example of CERT pointed out in Chapter 
III, the political benefits of community partnerships should not be underestimated. 
The thought of being more transparent about the level of service an agency can 
provide, and engaging community members in activities like planning may seem risky to 
some. However, it is important to remember that history has proven communities will 
routinely demand a greater delivery of services, not less. In the case of terrorism and 
homeland security, the benefits of community partnerships far outweigh the risk. Those 
who discard the notion of engaging the community fail to understand both the value and 
risk that external influences potentially have on an organization. 
C. RESPONSE 
The fire service has made significant progress in its preparation for terrorism 
response since 9/11. However, there remains much more to do, and funding is never 




for the foreseeable future, require fire service providers to look for new and innovative 
ways of providing that service without substantial increases in numbers of personnel or 
budget. 
The need to do more without corresponding increases in personnel and budgetary 
resources means the fire service must re-evaluate how it deploys the resources it has. 
Fundamentally, the only way to substantially increase response capability is to expand 
the base of operations and require the resources it currently has to do more. Programs 
such as the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 472, Operations Plus 
is one program that embodies this concept, and that should be seriously considered. 
To meet current and future demands, the FDNY distilled its evaluation of service 
into four simple categories: capability (what it can do), capacity (how much it can do), 
proficiency (how well can it be done), and deployment (how fast can resources arrive on 
scene to do what needs to be done). In search of new and innovative approaches to 
terrorism response, fire service providers need to also consider the possibility of multiple 
or simultaneous attacks. When considering these scenarios, the four-step FDNY 
methodology can provide invaluable insight on what will be required. This simple 
evaluation tool can be used in every agency across the country. 
Fire service providers need to better understand the regulatory environment as it 
pertains to terrorism. Although there are restrictions and rules to follow, there is also 
flexibility. Fire service providers are allowed to determine how personnel will respond, 
and what capabilities they will have. It is the agency that determines the capability, not 
the regulation. Those who follow tradition and culture because “that’s the way we’ve 
always done it” don’t appreciate the new paradigm of the post-9/11 environment.  
D. LEADERSHIP 
Whether we like it or not, the mission requirements changed significantly for the 
American fire service on 9/11. The fire service is in the most dynamic period of its 
history. Yet there remains no clear vision of what that mission will fully entail or how to 
develop the strategies necessary to meet the challenges that lie ahead. To be fully 
effective, the fire service must find a way to coalesce around a common vision, and begin 
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to speak with a common voice. To achieve those goals, new and dynamic leadership will 
be required. That is not to suggest that those currently in leadership positions should be 
replaced, only that new ideas and priorities need to be considered. 
As a lead agency, the International Association of Fire Chiefs is the best 
organization to meet the challenges of the future. Furthermore, it is vital that fire service 
leaders look beyond their own organizations, and purposefully attempt to work at the 
macro level. One of the best ways to break out of the “bureaupathology” that exists and 
to accomplish the changes in mission and culture that are needed, is to apply the four Is 
of transformational leadership. As the Army doctrine states, “Leadership is the most 
essential component of combat power or the ability to fight and win.”212  
E. THE WAY AHEAD 
As stated in the first chapter, this thesis is not about arguing one modality over 
another. It is about leadership and exploring new ways to meet the challenges of the post-
9/11 era. It challenges the status quo and the resistance to change based on the traditional 
wisdom of “that’s the way we’ve always done it.” Although there is comfort in viewing 
the future through the same lens that reflects the past, it is a dangerous position to take in 
a dynamic world.  
From a leadership perspective, maintaining the status quo means we are going 
nowhere. Status quo means there is no renewal, no vitality, and no greater hope for the 
future than was realized yesterday, last week, or last year. The fire service is rich in pride 
and tradition. It should never settle for compromise or complacency. This is the 
leadership challenge. 
The way ahead is not linear. It is chaotic, disorganized, and tumultuous, and there 
is no cookie-cutter recipe for success. It begins with challenging the status quo, and 
contemplating new ways to improve operations and the delivery of fire services. 
Individually, fire service leaders need to think globally and act locally.213 The current and 
most prevalent organizational model, that of a silo, must be dismantled, and replaced with 
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an adaptive and cooperative approach built on the understanding that the fire service is a 
complex network of networks. That means that both interagency and interdisciplinary 
cooperation must be fostered and maximized.  
Because the path ahead is not clear, fire service leaders should first look inward 
by engaging all levels of their respective organizations in active discussion and debate. 
Even individually, organizations need a vision before strategic planning can take place. 
This is how transformational leadership begins.    
Beyond individual agencies, the discussion should continue. Whether at the local, 
regional, or national level, fire service leaders need to critically evaluate their current 
service delivery system, and be capable of defending it or finding new and innovative 
ways to meet community and organizational demands. This will bring about dissent, 
which should be embraced, not squashed. 
I have argued in this thesis that the International Association of Fire Chiefs is the 
best association to provide leadership and a collective voice for the fire service. It is 
vitally important that those within the IAFC leadership understand that they are the ones 
who must promote progress. Both the executive director and IAFC president must accept 
the responsibility and articulate the importance of establishing a vision and a national 
strategy for homeland security to the IAFC membership. Once the significance of the 
issue has been elevated, they should collaborate and appoint a working group to begin the 
conceptual development of the vision. Whether that action is tasked to the executive 
development committee, an existing committee, a new ad hoc committee, or tasked to the 
IAFC’s newly formed International Fire Service Research Center and Policy Institute, it 
must start somewhere. Furthermore, those who are involved must be willing to take some 
risk and consider all options, not just those that are politically safe. 
Understanding that it is sometimes difficult to gain perspective when dealing with 
change, the International Association of Fire Chiefs should consider partnering with an 
outside organization, such as a university or the military. Institutions like the John F. 
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the Naval Postgraduate School, 
or U.S. Military Academy at West Point all have experience in studying and 
implementing change. The added benefit to partnering with an external organization is 
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that those from outside of the fire service will not have the same pre-existing biases that 
exist within the discipline. The absence of those biases may bring new perspectives.  
F. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the nation has not yet achieved its desired level of protection 
against terrorism, nor met its goal of homeland security. The same can be said about the 
fire service. If the fire service is going to maximize its delivery of services, meet the 
increasing expectations of the communities it serves, and provide for the safety of its 
personnel, fire service leadership must confront the status quo and reconsider its 
approach to terrorism. The way forward is to be actively involved in information and 
intelligence sharing, partnering with the community, vigorously exploring new response 
concepts, and leading, rather than being led. The world changed on 9/11, and the fire 
service needs to keep pace. As Chief Paulsgrove states, “We no longer make the four-
door Caprice.”214 
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APPENDIX. HOMELAND SECURITY SURVEY 
In support of this thesis, a survey was conducted of the largest 250 municipal fire 
departments in the country to determine baseline views on homeland security.215 The 
determining factor for city selection was based upon census statistics; the largest cities in 
the country arguably have the greatest exposure to the threats and consequences of 
terrorism. By constructing the survey in this manner, all cities with a population base of 
100,631 and greater were given the opportunity to participate.   
In all, 246 agencies were contacted (some represent more than one city), and 
asked to participate in the survey. The survey was sent to the fire chief or commissioner 
of each agency, and asked to comment on four homeland security related topics: 
intelligence, community engagement, response, and leadership. Each topic area contained 
five statements. The respondents were asked to select the most appropriate answer that 
expressed how they felt about each of the statements. They could choose from five 
possible answers for each statement: strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, and 
strongly agree. In order to preserve anonymity for the respondents, the surveys contained 
a control number precluding anyone outside of the survey to identify the participating 
agencies.  
On receipt of the completed surveys, the answers were scored using a five-point 
scale as follows: strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), neutral (3), agree (4), and strongly 
agree (5). For purposes of comparison, the survey results were further segregated into the 
top 250, top 50, and top 10. The survey was mailed on April 9, 2007, and was closed 
when the last survey was received on May 26, 2007.  
 
Survey Response 
A total of 246 surveys were sent, and 208 (84 percent) were returned. In addition 
to the results of the survey itself, the fact that so many chiefs and commissioners took the 
time to complete and return the survey indicates that there remains a strong interest in 
terrorism and homeland security.  
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This survey was tabulated by determining the mean and standard deviation for all 
questions. Standard deviations greater than 1 (>1) were considered outside of the norm.  




1. The primary purpose of intelligence is to avoid strategic surprise. 
Top 250: Number of responses: 206 Mean: 4.18  Standard Deviation: .74 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 41  Mean: 4.32  Standard Deviation: .52  
Top 10:  Number of responses: 10  Mean: 4.40  Standard Deviation: .52 
 
2. There is a definite link between intelligence and how the fire service should 
prepare (plan, budget, purchase equipment, and train) for homeland security. 
Top 250: Number of responses: 208 Mean: 4.20 Standard Deviation: .68 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 41  Mean: 4.27  Standard Deviation: .50  
Top 10:  Number of responses: 10  Mean: 4.40  Standard Deviation: .52 
 
3. In the post-9/11 era, it is important that the fire service be included in the 
information and intelligence sharing process. 
Top 250: Number of responses: 207 Mean: 4.61 Standard Deviation: .59 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 41  Mean: 4.76  Standard Deviation: .43  
Top 10:  Number of responses: 10  Mean: 4.90  Standard Deviation: .32 
 
4. There are significant legal issues that prohibit the fire service from having access 
to the same homeland security information that law enforcement routinely has 
access to. 
Top 250: Number of responses: 206 Mean: 3.24 Standard Deviation: 1.10 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 41  Mean: 3.17  Standard Deviation: 1.22 
Top 10:  Number of responses: 10  Mean: 2.90  Standard Deviation: .99 
 
5. Although most intelligence is not tactical (immediate action required) in nature, 




Top 250: Number of responses: 208 Mean: 4.48 Standard Deviation: .52 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 41  Mean: 4.51  Standard Deviation: .55  
Top 10:  Number of responses: 10  Mean: 4.80  Standard Deviation: .42 
 
Community Engagement 
1. A significant void exists between what homeland security response capability the 
fire service is able to provide and what the community expects. 
Top 250: Number of responses: 206 Mean: 3.80 Standard Deviation: .93 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 39  Mean: 3.67  Standard Deviation: .93  
Top 10:  Number of responses: 10  Mean: 3.60  Standard Deviation: .84 
 
2. The void that exists between fire service capability and community expectations 
should be minimized wherever possible. 
Top 250: Number of responses: 207 Mean: 4.32 Standard Deviation: .63 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 40  Mean: 4.48  Standard Deviation: .51  
Top 10:  Number of responses: 10  Mean: 4.60  Standard Deviation: .52 
 
3. The preservation of life and property is one of the most basic and yet most crucial 
expectations that citizens have of their government. 
Top 250: Number of responses: 204 Mean: 4.76 Standard Deviation: .51 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 39  Mean: 4.85  Standard Deviation: .37  
Top 10:  Number of responses: 10  Mean: 5.00  Standard Deviation: 0 
 
4. Similar to the master planning process, positive benefits could be realized by 
including community stakeholders in homeland security planning. 
Top 250: Number of responses: 203 Mean: 4.06 Standard Deviation: .70 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 38  Mean: 3.95  Standard Deviation: .80  
Top 10:  Number of responses: 10  Mean: 4.10  Standard Deviation: .57 
 
5. Maximizing community preparedness has the potential to significantly reduce 
dependence on emergency services during a naturally occurring or man made 
emergency.   
Top 250: Number of responses: 204 Mean: 4.16 Standard Deviation: .89 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 39  Mean: 4.18  Standard Deviation: .97  
Top 10:  Number of responses: 10  Mean: 4.20  Standard Deviation: .42 
90 
Response 
1. A tiered response that includes operations level, technician level, and specialist 
level personnel is appropriate for homeland security missions.  
Top 250: Number of responses: 204 Mean: 4.15 Standard Deviation: .65 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 39  Mean: 4.21  Standard Deviation: .57  
Top 10:  Number of responses: 10  Mean: 4.50  Standard Deviation: .53 
 
2. Hazardous materials response doctrine is primarily environmentally focused and 
not life safety focused 
Top 250: Number of responses: 203 Mean: 2.42 Standard Deviation: 1.10 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 39  Mean: 2.62  Standard Deviation: 1.25  
Top 10:  Number of responses: 10  Mean: 2.60  Standard Deviation: 1.26 
 
3. The same response methods employed for a hazardous materials incident are 
appropriate for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive 
incidents. 
Top 250: Number of responses: 203 Mean: 3.06 Standard Deviation: 1.18 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 39  Mean: 3.21  Standard Deviation: 1.22  
Top 10:  Number of responses: 10  Mean: 3.40  Standard Deviation: .97 
 
4. A hazardous materials incident and a terrorism incident are essentially the same, 
just on a grander scale. 
Top 250: Number of responses: 204 Mean: 2.53 Standard Deviation: 1.09 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 39  Mean: 2.74  Standard Deviation: 1.14  
Top 10:  Number of responses: 10  Mean: 2.90  Standard Deviation: 1.20 
 
5. New standards such as the National Fire Protections Association Standard 472 
Operations Plus have applicability to the fire service.    
Top 250: Number of responses: 196 Mean: 3.65 Standard Deviation: .68 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 38  Mean: 3.87  Standard Deviation: .74  






1. A high priority should be given to developing a national fire service strategy on 
terrorism.  
Top 250:  Number of responses: 201 Mean: 4.31 Standard Deviation: .63 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 40  Mean: 4.35  Standard Deviation: .53  
Top 10:  Number of responses: 10  Mean: 4.30  Standard Deviation: .67 
 
2. Fire service managers and leaders are under enormous pressure to meet the 
service delivery demands created by 9/11.  
Top 250: Number of responses: 200 Mean: 4.07 Standard Deviation: .84 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 40  Mean: 4.15  Standard Deviation: .95  
Top 10:  Number of responses: 10  Mean: 4.50  Standard Deviation: .71 
 
3. Public, private, and military leadership methods are wholly unique to their 
respective disciplines. 
Top 250: Number of responses: 201 Mean: 2.90 Standard Deviation: 1.08 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 40  Mean: 2.83  Standard Deviation: 1.13  
Top 10:  Number of responses: 10  Mean: 3.30  Standard Deviation: 1.25 
 
4. The fire service has historically been oriented as a response agency and that 
orientation is appropriate in the post 9/11 era.  
Top 250: Number of responses: 201 Mean: 3.17 Standard Deviation: 1.15 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 40  Mean: 2.83  Standard Deviation: 1.13  




5. Additional innovation and leadership will be required by the fire service in order 
to meet the demands of the 9/11 era. 
Top 250: Number of responses: 201 Mean: 4.37 Standard Deviation: .63 
Top 50:  Number of responses: 40  Mean: 4.38  Standard Deviation: .84  
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